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PREFACE
For many centuries Africa has never experienced lasting peace. Peace and stability
proved elusive in pre-colonial and colonial Africa. The scourge of slave trade, intertribal
warfare and imposition of colonialism could never have allowed peace and stability a foothold
in Africa. One would have expected emancipation and independence to usher in an era of
stability and relative peace. Instead, post-colonial Africa has experienced conflicts of a scale
and magnitude unwitnessed before. Pre-colonial Africa may have been volatile; but the
rudimentary nature of the weapons obtaining then and the unsophisticated organizational
structure of the societies, rendered conflicts more upsetting and indeed adventurous than
catastrophic. The emergence of an artificially constructed modern state with internal
contradictions, sophisticated state apparatus and weaponry, coupled with external forces has
made Africa one of the most unstable regions in the world, and peace prospects a daunting
task.
Conflict and civil wars have of course not been a preserve of the African continent.
Two world wars marked a dark period in the Northern hemisphere. History seemed to repeat
itself when the iron curtain collapsed. With the end of the cold war and the collapse of
communist hegemony in eastern and central Europe, states were plunged into tribal and ethnic
conflagration hitherto prevented by communist socio-political order. Ethno-nationalism seems
to have re-emerged in the western Hemisphere as well.
Africa was also not spared the adverse repercussions of the end of the cold war. While
super-power sponsored conflicts during the cold war were low-key (albeit protracted) due
to the balance of power in the region, post-cold war conflicts have been marked by
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unparalleled rapidity and devastating consequences. The situation has been worsened by the
dwindling of Africa's geopolitical importance in the post-cold war era. Africa's traditional
allies in the non-aligned movement and former socialist bloc have recapitulated due to post
cold war economic hardships. The result has been a general lack of concern with what
happens in Africa. While the United States and NATO are prepared to intervene in Haiti to
restore a democratic regime and in the former Yugoslavia to end 'ethnic cleansing',
respectively, no one is ready to intervene to avert a bloodbath in Rwanda or Sierra Leone.
After all, no strategic western interests are harmed there, and in any case the United Nations
Charter Prohibits intervention in internal affairs of other states! The short and long of this is
that the post cold war era punctuated by forces of economic liberalization and dominance of
the Breton Woods institutions in the economic management of the developing countries, have
not only accelerated the economic marginalization of Africa
_
placing her at the fringes of the
global economy
_
but also wrought insecurity in their wake.
This post-cold war "new order" only serves to emphasize the need for the OAU to
reinvent itself to cope with these new challenges. This thesis is an attempt to unmask these
and other challenges facing the OAU, make a postmortem of the performance of the OAU
in conflict resolution, and offer suggestions on how the OAU can critically re-evaluate and
refashion itself to face up to the old and new challenges that threaten the efforts to create
lasting peace in Africa.
There is no telling that the OAU past record in conflict resolution is not outstanding.
Perhaps this has to do with its history and constitution. The signing of the OAU Charter at
Addis Ababa in May 1963 was greeted with optimism and high expectations. Aspirations of
continental unity in a continent hitherto divided by the phenomenon of colonialism had
reached fruition. The polarizing differences experienced in the preceding preparatory
conferences pitting the radical Casablanca group against the conservative Monrovia camp had
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been bridged, and the biggest regional organization in the world was born. The OAU however
was not just an expression of continental efforts to achieve unity; it was by and large, a
culmination and a concrete expression of the aspirations of the pan-African movement dating
back to the beginning of the 20th century.
Dismay and disillusionment soon, however, replaced this optimism. The ink had not
dried on the Charter before the continent was plagued by a plethora of conflicts, civil wars
and a myriad of other problems. The celebrated organization that many had hoped would
consolidate continental security and nurture peace and stability had failed to deliver the goods.
Indeed civil wars, inter-state conflicts and their concomitant humanitarian crises
_
disruption
of socio-economic life and massive loss of lives and property
_
have bedeviled the African
continent since independence, threatening to tear the it apart. What went wrong?
A big debate has been raging on what went wrong. Many writers have attributed the
problems of inter-state and intra-state conflicts to the colonial legacy of artificial borders, and
the nature of the colonial state that was inherited after independence. Others have blamed the
dismal performance of the OAU, its inability to resolve conflicts, to its charter. The OAU
Charter, its normative structure, they argue, has an inbuilt tendency to encourage
ineffectiveness and ineptitude. The conservative application of the concept of non-
interference with internal affairs of states, and sanctity of borders, has completely rendered
the OAU ineffective.
Be that as it may, any objective view of the role the OAU has played in resolving
regional conflicts must take the aforementioned historical and ideological context, and internal
as well as external forces as the point of departure. That way one is able to discern and
appreciate the role played by OAU given the complexities and intricacies obtaining in conflict
situations in Africa.
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By examining the role played by OAU in regional conflict resolution and dispute
settlement, the present writer hopes to contribute to this debate. The introduction examines,
in a nutshell, the origins, purposes, principles and institutions of the OAU as envisioned in its
charter. The OAU's mechanisms of dispute resolution as well as case studies of its conflict
resolution activities is undertaken in chapter one. Chapter two examines the OAU-UN
interaction in African conflict resolution. In particular, the delimitation of competencies and
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction between the United Nations and the OAU is discussed.
The Problems and prospects of utilizing United Nations organs in resolving African conflicts
is also discussed in this chapter. Chapter three discusses legal and other impediments to
effective conflict resolution in Africa. Chapter four examines the need to create a regional
self-defense and intervention force as well as sub-regional conflict resolution mechanisms. The
conclusion summarizes the arguments in the rest of the thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
A purely contemporary view of any problem is necessarily a limited and even
distorted view. Every situation has its roots in the past ... the past survives
into the present; the present is indeed the past undergoing modifications. 1
A. The Origins of the OAU
Cultural and spiritual affinity among the black people is an age-old phenomenon
exhibited in the poetry and music of African people the world over. 2 But it is not until the
nineteenth century that this affinity evolved into fraternal solidarity, and eventually a
formidable movement in the common struggle against racial discrimination. 3 The OAU is the
present-day symbol and embodiment of the ideals of this pan-African movement.4 In its
formative stages the pan-African movement was led by black north American intellectuals. 5
'Quoted from Celestine O. Bassey, Retrospects and Prospects ofPolitical Stability in
Nigeria, 32 AFR. STUD. REV.97 (1989).
2
Prof. Wideman writes that "... rhythm, blues and rock 'n' roll are rooted in traditional
African music." JOHN EDGAR WIDEMAN, BROTHERS AND KEEPERS 197 (1984); See also Lawrence
W. Levine, African Culture and Slavery in the United States in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF AFRICAN
Diaspora 103 (Joseph E. Harris ed., 1982).
3 Elenga M'buytnga, Pan-Africanism or Neocolonialism 34-42 (1979).
4
See P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement (1982).
5 The man credited with coining the term "Pan-African Movement", Henry
Silvester Williams, was a West Indian Lawyer who was then practising Law in London.
See Owen Charles Mathurtn, Henry Silvester Williams and the Origins of the
Pan-African Movement (1976).
1
2Among the most notable ones was W.E.B. Dubois 6 and Marcus Gurney,7 although their
approach and philosophy differed. A series of pan-African conferences, starting with the 1900
Manchester conference, were organized in which goals for the advancement of black people
generally and the protection of native Africans from white settlers were formulated. 8
After the World War n, pan-Africanism took a continental dimension becoming a
potent force in the struggle for independence from colonialism in Africa.9 African intellectuals
like Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta and Sekou Toure, commencing with
the 1945 Manchester conference, took a center-stage in the movement. 10 Several conferences
were organized in the African soil at the the beginning of the twentieth century which
rearticulated the vision and reformulated the goals of the Pan-African movement. 11 Thus the
movement was transformed from a sentimentalized forum for racial solidarity to a movement
for self-determination of the African people geared towards the eradication of colonialism and
the promotion African nationalism. 12 In its continental phase four distinct goals of the
movement have been identified as:
1. complete independence for the entire continent;
2.development of fraternal alliance of Africans based on a loyalty which
would transcend all tribal and territorial affiliations;
3. Creation of a united Africa based on a federation of sub-regional groups within
which there would be a limitation of national sovereignty; and
4.non-intervention by Africans as partisans in international power politics. 13
6
See generally w.E.B. DU BOIS (David Lewis ed., 1995); Kwado 0. Pobi-Asanani, W.E.B.
Dubois, his Contributions to the Pan-African Movement (Daryl F. Mallet ed., 1994).
7See Jon Henrk Clark, Marcus Gurvey and the Vision of Africa (1974).
8 Ronald w. Walters, pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora 205 (1993).
9
ld.
10jon woronoff, organization of african unity 23 (1970).
1
•Gordon Harris, the Organization of African Unityk (1994).
12Woronoff ju/?ranotel0, at 28-56.
1Walters supra note 8, at 206.
3All the conferences that took place in Africa in one way or another echoed these goals. There
was consensus that regional cooperation and unity was crucial if the vast resources of the
continent were to be utilized for the prosperity of the continent and its people. 14
The road to continental unity was however marked with confounding obstacles.
Independent African states emerged from colonialism to find themselves balkanized into
regional and ideological groups that were, ironically, the fruits of the pan-African
conferences. 15 The main post-independent groups that preceded the OAU were: the
Casablanca Group composed of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, United Arab Republic and
the Algerian Provisional Government formed in January 1961: 16 The Pan African Movement
for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMESCSA); 17 The Monrovia Group composed of
Liberia, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Malagasy Republic, Togo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger,
Upper Volta, Peoples Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Gabon, Ethiopia and
Libya, formed between in May, 1961 ;
18
and the Brazzaville Group composed of Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Madagascar, Peoples' Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast,
Dahomey, Gabon, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal, and Chad formed in December,
I960. 19
"Id.
15
Esedebe supra note 4, at 161-162.
16
See The African Charter of Casablanca in louis b. Sohn, Basic Documents of African
Regional Organizations 42-43 (1971).
17
See Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice:: an East African Study 1 1 (1964).
18
See Decisions of the Monrovia and Lagos Conferences in Sohn supra note 16, at 53-54.
19Woronoff supra note 10, at 96.
4The preparatory meetings preceding the May 1963 Addis Ababa summit of African
leaders that was to adopt a charter for continental unity saw the African states balkanized into
two main ideological camps. The radical Casablanca group of states favored a continental
union government while the Conservative Monrovia group desired a loose continental body
of independent states. 20 The Addis Ababa conference had to find a middle ground to bridge
the gap between these groups opposed to each other. The OAU Charter therefore, as shall
be argued later, emerged as a compromise document that had lost its cutting edge. 21 Instead
of serving as blueprint for continental political unification as intended by the "progressive"
forces
_
to appease the conservative leaders
_
the Charter supported the status quo. It is this
compromise that is at the heart of the OAU conflict resolution and management crisis. 22 It is
argued that if the Charter's norm of non-intervention in internal affairs of member states
insulates internal conflicts from scrutiny and resolution by the OAU, sanctification of national
borders prevents the OAU from going to the bottom of the problem of border conflicts. 23
The OAU however cannot be divorced from the historical seetting within which it was
created. The OAU was born at an epoch-making period when the African states were
emerging from colonial rule. 24 It was natural that these newly independent states seek to
safeguard their sovereignty from any future subjugation while at the same time adopting a
common approach in the strruggle against the remaining vestiges of colonialism.
25 The aims
and objectives of the OAU embody these African concerns of the time and (as one will
observe) are not radically different from those of its predecessor_ the pan-African movement.
^See infra note 391 & 392.
21See infra note 393.
22See infra note 394.
"See infra note 410.
^See infra note 400.
"JUL
5It is also important to reiterate that the continental phase of the pan-African movement
and the struggle against colonialism was dominated by leaders of the pro-independence
nationalist movements. 26 It is these leaders propelled into the leadership of their respective
states by the granting of indepence, that converged at Adis Ababa to form the OAU. The
domination of the institutional structure of the OAU by these leaders is therefore not
accidental. 27
The preamble of the OAU Charter opens with the following words: "We, the heads
ofAfrican states and governments assembled in the city ofAddis Ababa, have agreed to the
present charter". 7* This underscores the predominant and exclusionist role the African heads
state have played in the formation and evolution of the OAU. 29 Contrast this with the
preamble of the United Nations Charter which starts with the words "We the peoples of the
United Nations"30 emphasizing the centrality of the people in the aims and objectives of the
United Nations, at least in theory. The success or failure of the OAU is therefore
consequently intertwined with the weaknesses or strengths of the African heads of state: an
indictment on the OAU is to the greatest extent an indictment on the African states'
leadership. Indeed the heads of state and governments constitute the supreme organ of the
OAU - the "Assembly of Heads of State And Governments". 31
The efficacy and effectiveness of an organization is to a large extent determined by
the nature of its Charter; its architectural foundation. It is therefore important to examine the
26See generally Hans Kohn, African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, (1965);
Woronoff supra note 10, at 1 1
.
27See Boutros-Gali infra note 86, at 364.
28The Charter of the Organization of African unity (hereinafter The OAU Charter) reprinted
in Sohn supra note 16, at 63.
^See Boutros-Ghali infra note 86, at 370.
3<The Preamble, U. N. Charter.
31
See The OAU Charter Art. Vm
6basic tenets of the OAU Charter to be able to appreciate how this impacts on its capacity to
resolve conflicts.
B. Purposes and Principles of the OAU
Article I of the OAU Charter delimits the geographical frontiers of the membership
of the OAU, which include the continental African states, Madagascar and other islands
surrounding Africa. 32 It was important to clarify the geographical limits of the OAU in order
to differentiate it with the mainstream pan-African movement which was diasporic in scope.
One can therefore discern, with the formation of the OAU, a shift in the pan-African
movement from a universal out-look to a regional world-view.
The purposes and objectives of the OAU, enumerated in Article II are:
a. to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states;
b. to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life
for the peoples of Africa;
c. to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
d. to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
e. to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 33
To the above ends Article II calls upon the member states to co-ordinate and
harmonize their general policies. Priority areas identified for harmonization and co-ordination
include: political and diplomatic cooperation; economic cooperation, including transport and
communication; educational and cultural co-operation; health, sanitation and nutritional
32
This was to appease Madagascar (Malagasy), whose name, now embodied in the name of
the organization (OAU), had earlier on been included in the Charter of the Monrovia Group. See the
Charter of the Inter-African and Malagasy Organization reprinted in Sohn supra note 16, at 55.
33 OAU Charter Art. 11(1).
7cooperation; scientific and technical co-operation; and cooperation for defense and security. 34
Clearly, the areas requiring harmonization through common efforts are diverse and encompass
all facets of socio-economic and political life of the member states. 35It is also evident that the
purposes of the OAU echo those of its progenitor, the pan-African movement.
The principles and norms that the OAU member states are pledged themselves to
observe scrupulously are enumerated in Article IV, and may be classified into three categories
depending on their teleological and philosophical underpinnings.36 Category one are principles
aimed at safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. These are:
principle 1 which recognizes the sovereign equality of all the member states; principle 2 which
prohibits interference in the internal affairs of states; and principle 3 which underlines the
member states pledge to pay respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state
and its inalienable right to independent existence. 37 Principle 4 which immortalizes the
principle of peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or
arbitration, may also fall in this category since it is a principle aimed at settling disputes
peacefully before they escalate into conflicts that may threaten sovereignty and territorial
integrity of member states. 38
34The OAU Charter Art. H (2).
35 The extent which these highly ambitious objectives have been achieved is difficult to
determine.
36The OAU Charter Art. m.
37The OAU Charter Art. IE.
38The OAU Charter Art. m.
8Category 2 principles are aimed at decolonization and emancipation of territories still
under the yoke of colonialism To this end the member states affirm their "absolute dedication
to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent". 39
Principle 7 stands in a category of its own. It represents an attempt by the member
states to create ideological uniformity in the member states foreign policy relations with non-
member states. The policy of non-alignment is the basis to govern the relations between the
member states and the superpower blocs. This principle is understandable seen in the
backdrop of the intensity of the cold war then. However, despite the member states strongly
professed adherence to no-nonalignment in theory, the question whether in practice they
followed it is a different matter.
Principle 5 may be put in category one or in a category of its own depending on how
one interprets it.
40 Condemnation of political assassination as well as subversive activities on
the part of neighboring states
_
seen as a measure to protect the national political institutions
from being undermined by extraterritorial forces
_
perfectly falls in category one. However
the provision on assassination is a curious one. It may been viewed as a measure to protect
and perpetuate the personalities occupying the highest offices in the land other than a
safeguard to the political institutions in the member states.
This thesis is concerned with dispute resolution. These principles will therefore be
examine in more detail later in so far as they affect the capacity of the OAU to resolve conflict
and settle disputes. In particular principles in category one dealing with protection of
territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states and non-interference in the internal
affairs of member states. Suffice it here to say that there is an inherent tension between the
desire to create a strong and effective organization but at the same time jealously guarding
39The OAU Charter Art. m (6).
40The OAU Charter Art. m.
9the sovereignty of the member states. And it is this tension that is at the heart of the
ineffectiveness of the OAU as a regional arbiter, and stabilizer.
C. Principal Institutions of the OAU
The task here is to mention the main organs of the OAU so as to have a holistic
appreciation of the organization before dealing with the niceties of conflict resolution. 41 In
a nutshell, the OAU Charter creates four "principal institutions" to carry out its mandate.
These are the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments; the Council of Ministers; the
General Secretariat, and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration.42
1. The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments
The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments is the supreme organ with a
general supervisory role over the other organs of the OAU.43 It has powers to discuss matters
of concern to Africa with a view to co-coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the
organization. Additionally, it may review the structure, functions and acts of all the other
organs and specialized agencies.44
The Assembly is composed of heads of state and government or their accredited
representatives. The Charter establishes an annual general meeting for the Assembly and an
extra-ordinary session at the request of any member state on approval by a two-thirds
4l
For a detailed analysis of the OAU Institutions See James S. Bowen, Power and Authority
in the African Context: Why Somalia Did not Starve
_
The Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU)
as an Example of the Constitutive Process, 14 Na'L BLACK L. J. 92, 101-107 (1992).
42 OAU Charter Art. VTL
43 OAU Charter Art. VIIL
44 OAU Charter Art. VUL
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majority.45 The Assembly of heads of states is also entrusted with the judicial function of
interpreting the Charter.46
2. The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers consist of foreign or such other ministers as designated by
the governments ofmember states.47 The role of the Council is to prepare conferences of the
Assembly, implement the decisions of the Assembly, and coordinate inter-African cooperation
in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly.48
3. General Secretariat
An administrative Secretary-General, appointed by the Assembly, directs the affairs
of the Secretariat.49 One or more Assistant Secretaries General shall also be appointed by the
Assembly. 50 The independence of the Secretary General and other staff of the Secretariat is
entrenched in the Charter. The Secretary General and other staff shall not receive instructions
from any other authority external to the organization and shall refrain from actions which
might reflect on their positions as international officials responsible only to the organization. 51
45OAU Charter Art. IX.
"^See The OAU Charter Art. XXVI which posits that questions of interpretation of the
Charter shall be determined by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government.
47OAU Charter Art. XH.
48
Evidently, the role of the Council of Ministers is adjunct to that of the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government. Indeed, Article XDI states that "The Council of Ministers shall be
responsible to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government."
49OAU Charter Art XVI.
^OAU Charter Art XVII.
51OAU Charter Art XVm.
11
The member states undertake to respect the exclusive character of the Secretary-General and
other staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.52
The Commission of Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation will be discussed in the
next chapter. At this point it is important as a concluding note to mention the voting process
in the OAU. For both the Assembly and the Council, two-thirds of the total membership form
the quorum. 53 Procedural and substantive matters in both the Assembly of Heads of state and
government and the Council of Ministers are determined by a simple and a two-thirds majority
of the total membership of the organization, respectively. This is a very significant threshold
in that one can envision the organs being paralyzed by lack of quorum. 54
52OAU Charter Art. XVm.
53See OAU Charter Art. X & XTV.
^Such paralysis of the Assembly took place when Morocco and its sympathizers boycotted
a OAU summit meeting prompted by the official recognition of the Sahara Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR) by the OAU. See Naldi infra note 148.
CHAPTER I
REGIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND PEACE
MAKING WITHIN THE OAU CONTEXT
A. Mechanisms for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the OAU Charter
That a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established under
the OAU Charter as one of the principal institutions of the organization, and a detailed
protocol elaborating on its composition, procedure and function, underlines the seriousness
with which the founders of the organization of African Unity valued dispute resolution by
peaceful means. 55 Indeed Article XIX establishing the commission, echo the prohibition of
the threat or use of force (in international relations) in the United Nations charter. 56
1. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
The protocol on the Commission forms an integral part of the OAU Charter. 57 The
protocol consists of six parts and provides in elaborate detail the modes, procedure and types
of dispute to be submitted for settlement. 58
Part one of the protocol deals with the establishment and organization of the
Commission. The Commission consists of twenty-one members elected by the Assembly from
55The OAU Charter Art. XIX.
56
U. N. Charter Art. 2 (4).
57The OAU Charter Art. XIX.
^See The Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
(Hereinafter The Protocol) reproduced in Sohn supra note 16, at 69-76.
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a list prepared by the Secretary General consisting of names of persons of recognized
professional qualifications nominated by the member states. 59 Each member state is entitled
to nominate two candidates and no two members of the Commission will hail from the same
state.
60
Members of the Commission hold office for a term of five years, and are eligible for
reelection. Upon expiry of their term members of the Commission remain in office until the
election of a new Commission. The members of the Commission shall complete any
proceedings in which they are already engaged the expiry of their term notwithstanding. 61
The tenure of office of the member of the Commission is secured by Article IV. They
shall not be removed from office except by decision of the Assembly of heads of state, by a
two-thirds majority of the total membership on the grounds of inability to perform the
functions of their office.62
The Commission shall be headed by a president and two vice-presidents elected by the
Assembly from among the members of the Commission for a period of five years without
eligibility for reelection. The three shall constitute the bureau of the Commission and shall be
full time members of the Commission while the rest of the Commissioners shall be part time. 63
Part two of the protocol entitled "general provisions," sets out the procedure for
dealing with disputes. The jurisdiction of the Commission is restricted to disputes between
59The Protocol Art. II.
6
°The Protocol Art. H
61The Protocol Art. m.
62The Protocol Art. P7.
63The Protocol Art. VL
14
states. It is assumed that even nonmember states may submit disputes interse or between
them and member states to the Commission for adjudication. 64
A dispute may be referred to the Commission jointly by the parties concerned, by a
party to the dispute, by the Council of Ministers, or by the Assembly.65 Where a dispute has
been referred to the Commission and one or more parties have refused to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, the Bureau shall refer the matter to the council of ministers
for consideration. 66 It is not clear what happens after referral to the council but it is rightly
assumed that the Council of Ministers makes a recommendation by means of a resolution
which may be submitted to the Assembly for approval. 67 It is doubtful however, whether the
resolution if passed by the Assembly is legally enforceable. 68
Article XIX establishes three alternative modes of settlement of dispute: mediation,
conciliation and arbitration. The three modes do not differ in any significant manner from the
way one knows them in international law.69 Among the three modes, the simplest and least
formal is mediation. Once the parties agree to mediation the president of the Commission is
obligated, with the consent of the parties, to appoint one or more members of the Commission
to mediate the dispute. 70 Once appointed the mediator shall endeavor to reconcile the views
^See The Protocol Art. XI; T. O. ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
International Law 170 (Richard Akinjinde ed., 1988).
65The Protocol Art. XHI.
66The Protocol Art. XHI.
67
See the OAU Charter Art. XIII; INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 77-159 (
Sir Francis Vallat ed., 1972).
68The Charter does not create any mechanism for enforcement of the decisions of the
institutions of the OAU.
^See Christine rhinlcin & Romana Sadurska, The Anatomy of International Dispute
Resolution, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DlSP.RESOL.39 (1991); Dayle Spencer & Honggang Yang, Lessons
from the Field of Intra-national Conflict Resolution, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (1992).
70The Protocol Art. XX
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of the parties and shall make written proposals to the parties as expeditiously as possible. The
means the mediator proposes, if accepted by the parties form the basis of a protocol of
arrangement between the parties. 71
Part IV elaborate the procedure of reconciliation. A request for conciliation is formally
submitted to the Commission by means of a petition addressed to the president by one or
more of the parties to the dispute. In the later case the petitioner must show that prior written
notice has been transmitted to the other party. The petition shall include a summary
explanation of the grounds of the dispute. 72 The president of the Commssion shall then set a
board of conciliators, consisting of three persons appointed by the president from among the
Commission and one appointee of each party. The president shall designate one of the
members of the Commission chairman of the board. In the nominations, care shall be
exercised to ensure none of the members of the board are nationals of the same state. 73
The duty of the board shall be to clarify the issues in contention and endeavor to bring
agreement between the parties upon mutually acceptable terms. The board has jurisdiction to
consider all questions submitted to it and may undertake any inquiry or hear any person
capable of giving any relevant information concerning the dispute. With the consent of the
parties the board shall determine its own procedure. 74
The parties have a right to be represented before the board by agents who shall also
act as intermediaries between the board and the parties. If the parties wish, the agents may
be assisted by counsel and other experts, and may request that all persons with relevant
evidence appear before the board. 75 Finally, at the close of the proceedings, the board shall
71The Protocol Art. XXI.
72The Protocol Art. XXTJ.
73The Protocol Art. XXIH.
74The Protocol Art. XXTV.
75The Protocol Art. XXV.
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draw a report stating whether the parties have come to an agreement, and if need be the terms
of such agreement or that it has been impossible to effect a settlement. 76 The report shall be
submitted to the president of the commission as soon as possible and shall be published only
with consent of the parties. 77
The procedure of establishing an arbitral tribunal is spelt out in part V. Each party to
the dispute shall designate an arbitrator from among the members of the Commission. The
parties shall pick only persons who are legally qualified. A third person to act as chairman of
the tribunal shall be designated from the members of the tribunal by the two arbitrators
appointed by the parties. If the two arbitrators fail to agree on the choice of a chairman within
one month, the Bureau shall designate one. 78
The president may, with the consent of the parties, appoint two additional members
who need not be members of the Commission but who shall have equal powers with the other
members of the tribunal. 79 To ensure objectivity and impartiality within the tribunal, the
arbitrators shall not be nationals of the parties, or have same territorial domicile with the
parties, or have served as mediators or conciliators in the same dispute. 80
Once parties to a dispute agree to go to arbitration such agreement shall be presumed
to be a submission in good faith to the arbitral award. This provision strikingly echoes the
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda? 1 As evidence of such agreement the
parties shall conclude a compromis specifying the undertaking of the parties to go to
arbitration, and to accept as legally binding, the decision of the tribunal. The compromis shall
7<The Protocol Art. XXVI (1)
77The Protocol Art. XXVI (2).
78The Protocol Art. XXVII (1).
79The Protocol Art. XXVH (2).
80The Protocol Art. XXVE (3).
81The Protocol Art. XXVm.
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further specify the subject matter of the dispute and the seat of the tribunal. 82 The compromis
may also specify the law to be applied, and if the parties agree to adjudicate ex aequo et bono.
The time limit within which the arbitrators shall give an award, and the appointment of
counsel to take part in the proceedings may also be indicated in the compromise
In a case where the compromis is silent on the law to be applied, the tribunal shall
decide the dispute according to the treaties concluded between the parties, international law,
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Charter of the United Nations, and with
the consent of the parties, ex aequo et bono. 94 The hearings shall be in camera unless the
arbitrators decide otherwise. A record of proceedings signed by the registrar and the
arbitrators shall alone be authoritative of the proceedings. The arbitral award shall be in
writing and shall state reasons for every point decided. 85
Such elaborate machinery clearly demonstrates the founding fathers desire to settle
conflicts and disputes by peaceful means through certain and formal procedure. The irony of
it, however, is that no member state has ever submitted their dispute for adjudication by the
commission. The effectiveness or otherwise of this machinery has therefore never been tested.
Indeed the Commission is of phantom existence. Instead the OAU and its member states have
resorted to ad hoc committees and good offices to resolve their conflicts, totally ignoring the
existence of the Commission .
Writers in the early stage of the existence of the OAU attributted this anomaly to the
infancy of the commission, pleading that the commission is of recent creation and needs time
to evolve a mondus operandi. 96 Others attributed the redundancy of the commission to the
82The Protocol Art. XXIX (1).
83The Protocol Art. XXIX (2).
84The Protocol Art. XXX.
85The Protocol Art. XXXI.
86Boutros-Ghall The Adis Ababas Charter 45 (1964).
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susceptibility of African disputes to "friendly solutions".87 However time has proved
otherwise. Thirty five years down the road, the Commission is yet to come out of its infancy.
More often than not African disputes have been settled at the battlefield other than at a round
table conference. Perhaps the greatest weakness that has militated against the emergence of
the Commission as a viable vehicle for peaceful settlement of disputes is its very nature - it
can only be moved to action through the consent of the disputants and, further more, there
is no machinery in place for the enforcement of its decisions; hence hardly any incentive to
disputants to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 88
2. Other Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
As already mentioned the OAU has preferred the use of good offices and ad hoc
committees to deal with conflicts to the formal machinery provided by the Commission of
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. Perhaps such less formal procedures are more
attuned to the fluidity and rapidity of conflict situations in Africa that defy overly legalistic
and time consuming formalistic solutions. 89 It is no accident then that most conflicts and
disputes in Africa have been addressed through ad hoc arrangements.90
87
F.C. Okoye, International Law and the New African States 147 (1972).
88See The OAU Charter Art. XIX, XXH, XXVH & XXXI.
^See Gassama infra note 345, at 285.
^See Meyers infra note 293, at 419.
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Under the incumbent Secretary-General Of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, a new
mechanism, perhaps intended to replace the obsolete Commission of Mediation, Conciliation
and Arbitration, has been created. This Mechanism dubbed "OAU Central Organ for conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution," has registered some measure of success in dealing
with the recent Zairean crisis. 91 Its "peace quartet" organized a series of conferences in
Nairobi (Kenya), and in its last meeting in Togo managed to bring the rebels forces of Laurent
Kabila and the government of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko to a negotiating table. 92 Plans are
also underway of establishing an early warning system to facilitate investigation of potential
conflict areas and timely intervention.93 Efforts to establish whether this mechanism is another
ad hoc arrangement, a specialized Commission envisioned under Article 22 (the most
probable option), or an institution of the OAU established through an amendment to the
charter (most improbable option), were fruitless.94
B. The Performance of the OAU in Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement: Case
Studies
This subsection undertakes case studies of conflicts in Africa with the aim of grasping
the challenges that faced the OAU in each conflict and how the OAU responded to those
challenges. A thematic as well as a sub-regional approach is adopted. In the Maghreb the
Morocco-Algeria border conflict and the Western Sahara conflict are discussed. The
Ethiopia/Somali/Kenya border conflict is the focus in the horn of Africa. In West Africa the
9l
PanAfrican News Agency, http://cgi-bi.nando.net/pIweb-cgi..., 07/02/97.
92
PanAfrican News Agency, http://cgi-bin.nando.net/pIwewb-cgi..., 07/02/97.
93
Pan-African News Agency (PANA), May 1 1 , 1997.
94The present writer relied on electronic material which provided partial information.
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Nigerian civil war is examined, Central Africa the Congo crisis, and in Southern Africa the
Southern Rhodesian crisis. It is worth the while however to attempt a characterization of
conflicts before embarking on case studies.
1. Characterization of Conflicts and Case Studies
Scholars have come with different ways of classifying conflicts.95 Elias places post-
colonial African conflicts into two categories: (I) those that may be regarded as inherited, in
the sense that they emanate from the complex of rights and obligations that devolved upon
the new states in the consequences of state succession; and (ii) those that are the result of
post-independence alignments mainly in the economic and technical spheres.96 Furley
categorizes them into intra-state and inter-state conflicts.97
Inter-state conflicts are in the main caused by border disputes emanating from the
colonial legacy.
98
African state boundaries are traceable to the Berlin conference of 1889 at
which the European imperial powers partitioned Africa into spheres of influence oblivious of
the natural boundaries between the different nationalities.99 Thus for example the Somali are
divided among Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia while the EWE are divide into Dahomey, Togo,
and Ghana. 100
95
See Ted Robert Gurr, Theories of Political Violence and Revolution in the Third World
in CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 153-189 (Francis Deng & William Zartman eds., 1991).
^.o. Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law, 162 (1988).
97
01iver Furley, Introduction: Africa in the Habit of Conflict in CONFLICT IN AFRICA 9
(Oliver Furley ed., 1995).
^For a thorough discussion the phenomenon of African colonial boundaries see IAN
Brownlie, African boundaries: a Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (1979).
"See European Imperialism and the Partition of Africa (E. F. Penrose ed. 1975).
100Cervenka infra note 1 13, at 51
.
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Intra-state conflicts have a myriad of causes ranging from ethnic animosity emanating
from the divide and rule tactics of the colonial regimes in Africa (for instance Hutu-Tutsi
conflict in Rwanda and Burundi) or historical differences between groups. 101 Other causes of
conflict are connected with disparities in the distribution of wealth within the states. 102
Governance problems and human rights violations are other principal causes of conflicts in
Africa. 103 Other intra-state conflicts are closely linked with the nature of the nation-state in
Africa
_
the so-called crisis of the nation-state
_
characterized by a monopolization of state
power and wealth by one elite faction and the ensuing conflict caused by attempts by excluded
elite groups to wrestle power from the group controlling state apparatus and national wealth,
exacerbated by the ruling elite defense of the status quo at all costs. 104 The Ethiopian civil war
that claimed a lot of lives has been viewed as reactions by other elite groups (mainly the
Tigrey and the Oromo) excluded from the spoils of state power by the Amahara ruling
class.
105 There are other conflicts caused by special problems like conflicts caused in Southern
Africa by the destabilization policies of the former apartheid regime in South Africa. 106
101For instance the Chad conflict is basically an ethnic conflict between the Muslim Arabs in
the North and Black Africans in the South who are either Christians or profess African traditional
religions. For a detailed discussion of this North-South divide see Rene Lemarchard, Chad: the
misadventures of the North-South Dialectic, 29 AFR. REV. 27 (1986).
102See M. Louise Pirouet, The Effects of Conflict, I: Human Rights and Refugees in Furley
supra note 97, at 274.
103For a discussion of the process of class-formation and ensuing conflict see Emmit N.
Evans, Sources of Socio-political Instability in an African State: The Case ofKenya's Educated
Unemployed, 20 AFR. STUD. REV. 52 (1977).
104
See David Throup, the Colonial Legacy in Furley supra note 97, at 237-274.
105Patricx Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia 175-
227(1975).
106
See Tom Lodge, Perspectives on Conflict Resolution in South Africa in Deng et all
supra note 95, at 115-149
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It is important to note that the characterization of conflicts into intra-state and inter-
state is arbitrary because of the complexity and interconnectedness of causes and
consequences. Intra-state conflicts more often than not do have extra-territorial effect while
inter-state conflict certainly have intra-state repercussions. Secondly, although the above
categorization is useful as an aid to analysis, it is too broad. It is possible to subdivide African
conflicts into seven less broader categories: intra-state conflicts arising from the colonial
legacy of artificial borders; conflicts emanating from colonial state succession; conflicts
involving "illegitimate" and "racist" regimes resulting from delayed decolonization; internal
conflicts resulting from secessionist movements; conflicts resulting from challenges to the
legitimacy of the authority in power, conflicts involving external intervention; and conflicts
with strong religious or ethnic underpinnings. 10 '
a. Inter-state Conflicts Arising from the Colonial Legacy of Artificial Borders
I. The Algerian-Morocco Border Conflict
This conflict was the first test case on the capacity of the infant OAU to resolve
conflicts. It is also a microcosm of other border conflicts bedeviling the continent in that it
illustrates the legacy of colonialism.
108 The actual conflict erupted in July 1962 when, after
the referendum that ushered in Algeria's independence (after a bloody war of liberation),
Moroccan troops tried to occupy the border Town of Tindouf, claiming that it formed an
107
Ellen Frey-Wouters identifies five categories. The present writer deviates from this
classification by discerning seven categories, buying from Frey-wouters two categories on conflicts
involving external intervention and the one involving illegitimate and racist regimes. Ellen Fre-
Wouters, The Relevance of regional Arrangements to Internal conflicts in the Developing World in
Law and Civil War in the Modern World 466-473 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
108
Alf Andrew Heggoy, Colonial Origins of the Algerian Morocco Border Conflict, 13
Afr. Stud. Rev. 22 (1970).
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integral part of the kingdom of Morocco.The gorvernment of Algeria responded through
military force. 109
The genesis of the problem can however be traced to the beginning of French colonial
rule in the Maghreb. When the French conquered and occupied Algeria in 1830, Morocco had
existed as a distinct entity from time immemorial. 110 To serve their own interest the French
avoided demarcating the boundary between Morocco and Algeria, and indeed despite signing
several treaties with Morocco none of those treaties attempted to fix a boundary between
Morocco and Algeria. 111 This and the Islamic concept of umma, denoting a nation as a
community of believers, to be distinguished from the western concept of a nation with
ascertainable territorial entity, encouraged Morocco to harbor irredentist ambitions. 112 So
that when the French were forced by the Algerian bloody war of liberation to withdrew from
Algeria in 1962, seeds of conflict had been germinating for a long time. 113
In the process of that bloody conflict Morocco decided to submit the dispute to the
Security Council while Algeria, favoring an African solution took the dispute, to the OAU.
Morocco however was persuaded by its allies within the Security Council to seek an African
solution first.
114 Hence emperor Haile Sellasie of Ethiopia and President Modibo Keita of Mali
organized a meeting in Bamako to negotiate a cease-fire. 115 Although the negotiated
armistice was short-lived, the meeting produced the famous Bamako communique which
109Frank E. Trout, Morocco's Saharan Frontiers, 426 (1969).
1 10
I. William Zartrman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa 19(1 964).
111Woronof supra note 10, at 336.
ll2Amanwah infra note 135, at 202.
113Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African Unity 52 (1968).
114Okoye supra note 87, at 148.
u5Cervenka supra note 113.
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consisted of a five point plan:
1. the immidiate end of hostilities;
2. the creation of a committee composed of Algerian, Moroccan, Ethiopian and
Malian military officers to define a demilitarised zone;
3. the supervision of security and military neutrality in the demilitarized zone by
Ethiopian and Malian observers;
4. the request for an extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, for the
purpose of creating a committee of arbitration to effect a definitive solution of
Algerian-Moroccan dispute, and
5. the cessation of hostile propaganda attacks. 116
An extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers was convened in Addis
Ababa, in November 1963, to discuss the conflict. 117 It is important to summarise the
arguments that delegates of both parties submitted to the Council of Misters to see how
diametrically opposed both sides were and the dificult position in which the OAU found
itself. Morocco submitted the following arguments:
1
.
Morocco had an historic claim to the area;
2. Morocco made reference to various treaties concluded with France, and the treaty
with Algerian provisional gorvernment in 1961;
3. since the French left the frontier between Morocco and Algeria undefined,
Algeria should honor the 1961 agreement. 118
Algeria replied with the following arguments:
1. that the 1961 agreement was signed under force majeure, and would therefore not
be honored;
116Woronoff supra note 10, at 338.
117
Trout supra note 169, at 428.
118
S. O. Agbl The Organization of African Unity and African Diplomacy 9 (1986).
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2. Morocco's expansionism was anti-OAU Charter and could, if allowed, destroy the
OAU;
3. 'to wish to impose unilaterally the least revision of the Algerian-Moroccan border
is without doubt to create a precedent or an unfortunate jurisprudence for the future
of many African state.' 119
Clearly the Council of ministers was in a quandary, here are parties with equally strong
but irreconcillable positions. Characteristically the Council avoided dealing with the
substantive issues raised by both parties and instead appointed an ad hoc committee
composed of Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tanganyika "to
examine the crisis in all its ramifications within the spirit of Bamako". 120 The so-called
commission of seven had several meetings with the parties present but none of them appears
to have decisively changed the status quo. 121
However, it appears the disputants were undergoing a change of heart; the two
governments announced on February 20, 1864 that they had signed an agreement and
resumed diplomatic ties! A series of negotiations culminated in a general treaty of cooperation
and solidarity between the two countries. 122
It would be erroneous to credit the end of this conflict singularly to the efforts of the
OAU. There is no doubt that the ad hoc committee facilitated (to a great measure) the
negotiations that preceded the settlement. The final settlement of the conflict however appears
to have originated from the protagonists. Be that as it may, a conflict that exhibited signs of
future catastrophe in a fragile continent had been resolved.
119
Id. at 9-10.
120Amanwah infra note 135, at 203.
121Woronoff supra note 10, at 340-342.
122
Id. at 343-344.
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ii. The Ethiopia/Somalia/Kenya Border Conflict
This is yet another conflict with roots in Africa's colonial past. The Somalis are
perhaps the best example of the arbitrariness with which the European colonial powers went
about dividing Africa. 123 It is not possible here to give an account of the history of the
establishment of the colonial state in the horn of Africa. 124 Suffice it to say that for the
convenience of the colonial powers the Somali people were subdivided into the four countries
that constitute the horn. 125 They occupy one-fifth of Ethiopia, one-third of Djibouti and one-
fifth of Kenya. 126 The protests by the Somalis against this balkanization fell on deaf hears. The
British colonial authorities signed treaties with Ethiopia that completely transferred the
Ogaden region occupied by the Somalis to Ethiopia, despite consistent objections from the
Somalis. 127 To add an insult to injury, when the British were granting independence to Kenya
in 1963, they ignored the wishes of the inhabitants of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya
(NFD) who were predominantly Somalis, to be unified with Somalia. 128
So that the irredentist stance taken by Somalia immediately after independence in
1960 was neither unexpected nor surprising. 129 Somalia called for self-determination for
123See Generally Peter Anyang Nyong'o, The Implications of Crises and Conflict in the
upper Nile Valley, in Deng et aal supra note 95, at 95-1 14.
124
See Michael Chege, Conflict in the Horn ofAfrica, in AFRICA PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE
AND DEVELOPMENT 87-100 (Emmanuel Hansen ed. 1987).
125
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti.
126
Nzongola-Ntalaja, The National Question and the Crisis of Instability in Africa, in
Hansen supra note 124, at 65.
127tom j. Farer, War Clouds in the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Detente 57 (1976).
128
Id. at 77.
129
I. William Zartman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa 173 (1964).
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Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia. 130 The determination of Somalia to create a "Greater Somalia"
and their resentment of what they viewed as British betrayal was registered in March 1963
when Somali broke diplomatic relations with Britain. 131 The tension that had been building
reached its peak in 1964 when Somali nationals raided Ethiopian and Kenyan army and police
posts.
132
Earlier on Somalia's attempt to introduce the dispute for discussion at the OAU
inaugural conference, found stiff opposition from Ethiopia, and the matter was shelved. 133
However, due to continued incitement of the Ethiopian Somali population by Somalia
through radio broadcasts, Ethiopia requested an extraordinary session of the Council of
Ministers to discuss what Ethiopia considered "aggression" by Somalia. 134 The Somali
government too requested the Secretary-General for inclusion of the dispute in the agenda
of the extra-ordinary session. Both disputants were asked to present their cases before the
Council of Ministers when it met on February 12, 1964. 135 Regrettably, the resolution that the
Council passed, other than imploring both sides to settle their differences amicably in
accordance with the OAU Charter; did not address the substance of the problem. 136 Neither
130
Nzongola-Ntalaja supra notel26, at 66.
131
I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland: From Nation to State, 193
(FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, INC., 1965)
132Chege supra note 124, at 90.
133Lewis supra note 131, at 198.
l34
Id. at 27.
135H.A. Amankwah, International Law, Dispute Settlement and Regional Organizations in
the African Setting, in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (Frederick E.
Snyder & Surakiart Sathirai eds., 987).
136
Id.
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did the next extra-ordinary Council of Ministers meeting that took place in Lagos (Nigeria)
go to the bottom of the problem. 137
Somalia underlined the importance of self-determination for the Somali populations
in the disputed region while Ethiopia warned of the danger of attempting to revise Africa's
borders. The words of the Ethiopian delegate captures the dilemma that the colonial borders
placed on the OAU: "If we seek to redraw the map of Africa on the basis of the so-called
tribal or racial or ethnic affinities, we will have cast ourselves adrift on a wild sea in a voyage
that can only end in disaster." 138 Understandably, the Somalia proposal was rejected and both
sides were asked to respect each others territorial integrity. The Council of Ministers further
ordered the continuation of the cease-fire previously agreed, and cessation of hostilities. 139
Ethiopia had succeeded in playing on Africa's worst fears
_
let those in the Council of
Ministers who do not live in glass houses throw stones by attempting to revise the Ethiopia-
Somalia boundary.
The cease-fire was as good as it lasted. Internal circumstances were changing; casting
the fragile peace on a precarious balance. A new government took power in Somalia and
affirmed that it would follow the expansionist policies of the previous government. 140
However immediate danger was averted when, through diplomatic efforts of president
Kaunda of Zambia, a memorandum of understanding ending tension between Kenya and
Somali was signed by the president of Kenya and the prime minister of Somalia. 141 This
seemed to cool matters between Ethiopia and Somalis for a while as well. 142
137Agbi supra note 1 18, at 27.
l3
*Id. at 28.
139Woronoff supra note 10, at 351.
140
Farer supra note 127, at 89.
14V at 90.
142Chege supra notel24, at 93.
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As fate would have it, a new government led by Siad Barre took power in Somalia. 143
Although Bare did not embark on an expansionist policy immediately (apparently due to
internal problems), at the 21st meeting of the Council of Minister in Addis Ababa in May
1973, Somalia attempted to persuade the summit to formally agree that a dispute existed
between Ethiopia and Somalia, but the Council rejected Somalia's proposal. That marked
the begging of a succession of events that culminated in the devastating war between Ethiopia
and Somalia between 1975 and 1978. 144 Participation by the superpowers on both political
divides escalated the war.
145
Efforts by the OAU ad hoc committee to settle the conflict come
to nought. 146 Due to war weariness on the part of Somalia coupled by the OAU's recognition
of the Ogaden region as part of Ethiopia, and lack of resources to continue the war, the
Somalia forces who were already being pushed out of Ethiopian territory gave up the war. 14 '
b. Conflicts Arising from Colonial State Succession
The Western Sahara Conflict
No other dispute has shaken the very foundations of the OAU like the protracted
Western Sahara conflict.
148
Following the admission of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic
143
Christopher Clapham, The Horn ofAfrica: a Conflict Zone in Furley supra note 97, at
76.
144Wat78.
145Clapham supra note 143, at 77.
,46Cervenka supra note 1 1 3, at 52.
147Chege supra note 124, at 93-95.
1480ther than illustrating the intricacies of conflict resolution in Africa, the Western Sahara
conflict is also a study in the problem of state succession, imperatives of state membership in the
OAU, and the legal problem of attributing statehood to a territorial entity. For details see J. Naldi,
The Organization ofAfrican Unity and the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, 26 J. AFR. L.152
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(SADR) 149 to the OAU, a Morocco instigated boycott brought the activities of the OAU to
a halt when the nineteenth summit conference planned to held in Tripoli (Libya) failed to take
place due to lack of quorum. 150
A voyage back to history puts the conflict into perspective. Spain acquired the
territory of what is now Western Sahara between 1884 and 1934. 151 The kingdom of Morocco
which existed from time immemorial before the emergence of Spain into the scene, protested
the occupation of this territory by Spain; claiming sovereignty over it. 152 Mauritania the
southern neighbor too claimed this territory as forming part of Mauritania. 153
Under pressure from these expansionist regional states, and desirous of keeping its
colonial acquisition, Spain declared Western Sahara one of its provinces in 1958. Spain's
decision raised furore and opposition within the United Nations General Assembly, and from
Morocco and Mauritania. 154 At the prompting by the security Council Spain accepted to hold
a referendum to determine whether the Sahawi, the inhabitants of the territory desired to rule
themselves, to join Morocco or Mauritania, or remain under the protection of Spain. 155
(1982).
149
Sahara Arab Democratic Republic. See Jeremy Harding , The Fate of Africa 103
(1993).
150
Naldi supra note 148, at 152.
151Azzedine Layachi, The OAU and Western Sahara: A Case Study, in THE ORGANIZATION
of African Unity After Thirty Years p.29 (Yassin El-ayouty ed.,1994).
l52
Id.
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Unity), 13 GA. J. IN'L & COMP. L. 372,382 (1983).
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Layashi supra note 151, at 28.
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Spain's attempts to hold a plebiscite in keeping with the earlier demands by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1965 156 and the OAU in 197257 was, however, preempted
when, largely due to Morocco's and Mauritania's diplomatic efforts, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. 158
The questions the court was asked to answer were the following:
1. Was Western Sahara (Rio De Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullis)?
If the answer to the first question is to the negative,
2. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity? 159
The court found there existed some "legal ties of allegiance" between the Sultan of
Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of western Sahara, and equally, legal
ties existed between the Mauritanian entity and the territory of Western Sahara. The court
held however that the evidence presented did not establish any ties of sovereignty between
the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. The
court therefore found nothing preventing the General Assembly from "implementing the
principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the
peoples of the territory". 160
156G.A. Res. 2072, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 59-60, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
157
A.H.G. Res. 272, 9th Ord. Sess., Rabat, June 12-15. 1972 taken into consideration by the
General Assembly in G.A. Res. 2983, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.30, at 84-85, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972).
158G.A. Res. 3292, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 103-04, U.N. Doc. A/9632
(1974).
159GA. Res. 3292, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 104, U.N. Doc. A/9632
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Although the court's decision was an unequivocal rejection of any claim by Morocco or
Mauritania to Western Sahara the intransigent King Hassan II of Morocco ironically
interpreted the court's decision in his favor, and proceeded to organize the so-called "Green
March," an invasion of Western Sahara by Moroccan troops and civilians. 161 Problems at
home coupled with pressure from the United States, however forced Spain, under the terms
of the so-called Madrid Accords, to cede Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. 162
Algeria the main backer of the Sahrawi nationalist movement (POLISARIO), 163 that
had been waging a guerilla warfare against Spanish occupation, was outraged by the turn of
events.
164 With Algeria's backing, POLISARIO shifted its attacks to Morocco and Mauritania
until the later withdrew in 1979 due to internal problems. 165 The rising tension reached its
peak in 1976 when POLISARIO proclaimed western Sahara an independent state under the
name SAhrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). 166
Two Council of Ministers meetings, in February and July 1976 in Addis Ababa and
Mauritius, respectively affirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination but did
not come up with concrete proposals on how to conclusively tackle the conflict. 167 Attempts
161
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162Agreement on the question of Western Sahara, Nov. 14, 1975, Morocco-Mauritania-
Spain, reproduced in Third Report by the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 379 (1975)
concerning Western Sahara, U.N. Scor, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/l 1880, annex 1 (1975).
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165 There was internal instability subsequent to a military coup in Mauritania. Ramphul
supra note 153, at 383;
166Harding supra note 149, at 105.
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Layashi supra note 151, at 33.
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between 1976 and 1978 to call an extraordinary meeting failed owing to lack of quorum. 168
Subsequently, a summit took place in Khartoum where an ad hoc committee ("committee of
wise men") consisting of Mali, Guinea, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Tanzania, was formed to
look into the conflict. 169 In 1979 at the Monrovia conference, the OAU passed a resolution
calling for a cease-fire and the holding of a free referendum for the inhabitants of Western
Sahara to exercise their right of self-determination. 170 In the mean time, the United Nations
General Assembly recognized POLISARIO as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi
people. 171
At the Nairobi summit in 1981, the "committee of wise men" proposed a three point
plan for the resolution of the conflict: (1) cease-fire and direct negotiations between the
parties; (2) establishment of a multinational peace keeping force and an interim administration;
and (3) referendum organized by the OAU and the United Nations. 172 However the plan was
not implemented because the implementation committee appointed to succeed the "committee
of wise me," failed to bring the parties to a negotiating table. 173
In February 1982 the events took a new turn when, in a Council of Ministers' meeting,
the OAU Secretary General, Edem Kodjo, admitted the SADR to the membership of the
OAU. This decision, inter alia, caused a crisis that made the OAU Tripoli summit fail to
1(
*Id.
169
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take place. 174 By 1984 Morocco managed to complete building a wall surrounding what it
termed the "Useful triangle."175 POLISARIO in turn planned its greatest attack, "the Maghreb
offensive," on Morrocco that proved to Morroco that the wall was not "watertight". 176
However, by 1989 circumstances seemed to change; internal problems in Morocco
and Algeria, pitting both states against religious fundamentalist groups, forced the two to
resume diplomatic ties.
177
Attempts at direct negotiations between Morocco and POLISARIO
were also made. The establishment of United Arab Maghreb (UAM), an economic grouping
in the region further explains the thawing of relationship between Morocco and Algeria. 178
It is at this point that the arena of efforts to resolve this conflict changed from the
OAU to the United Nations. After a series of initiatives the Secretaries-General of the United
Nations and the OAU worked out a comprehensive plan for a referendum to be held towards
the end of 1990 or at the beginning of 1992. 179 The plan was approved by both the General
Assembly and the Security Council. Subsequently, a United Nations Mission (MINURSO),
consisting of a multinational force and military observers to oversee the implementation of
the plan, was created, with both parties agreeing to the plan. 180
However, a key obstacle to the implementation of the plan emerged on the way.
POLIASARIO and Morocco could not agree on the formula of identifying the true inhabitants
174
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ofWestern Sahara. While POLISARIO produced a list of 74,000 people based a 1974 census
by Spain, Morocco on the other hand provided a roll of 200,000 people claiming to be
Sahrawi181 Due to this fundamental disagreement, the United Nations plebiscite failed to take
place. Morrocco continues to occupy Western Sahara to this day. 182
This is one of the conflicts in Africa that cries for resolution. The security Council
needs to come up with a formula to determine who are the genuine inhabitants of Western
Sahara so that the long overdue referendum can take place and the Sahrawi can live in peace
again. Any objective observer will agree that taking the 1974 census as a point of departure
in determining the original genuine inhabitants is the most realistic formula. Why the Security
Council has dilly-dallied over this purely technical exercise is difficulty to fathom. 183
c. Conflicts Involving "Dlegitimate" and "Racist"Regimes Resulting from Delayed
Decolonization
The Namibian and Zimbabwean struggle for independence and the south Africans'
struggle against the apartheid regime falls under this category. These conflicts, unlike the
other conflicts where the OAU had to be seen acting as a neutral and impartial arbiter, the
181
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182
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183The latest action by the Security Council on the Western Sahara conflict is Security
Council Resolution 1084. The Security Council reaffirms its earlier resolutions on the Western
Sahara Conflict and its commitment to hold a referendum to determine the wishes of the inhabitants.
The resolution also calls upon the Secretary-General to continue with the efforts to break the impasse
blocking the implementation of security Council Resolutions and submit an interim report by
February 28, 1997, and a comprehensive report on the implementation of this particular resolution by
May 9, 1997. The resolution however falls short of the expectations of the suffering inhabitants of
Western Sahara and many observers of the conflict because while in Resolution 1084 the Council
"decides to remain seized of the matter," the resolution limits the operation of the United Nations
mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to 31 May 1997 without making a concrete decision on the
critical issue of what formula is to be used in determining the genuine inhabitant of Western Sahara
to vote in the proposed referendum and when to hold such referendum. By prevaricating on the
critical issues, the Security Council once again plays into the hands of King Hassan II of Morocco
whose irredentist posture has shown his determination to subvert, by any means, the right of the
Sahrawi to self-determination. U.N. SCOR. 371th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1084 (1996).
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OAU directly challenged the legitimacy of the regimes in these countries. 184 It viewed these
regimes as vestiges of white supremacy from the colonial era and therefore unacceptable. 185
The OAU initiatives to liquidate these illegal regimes was double-pronged; a diplomatic war
within the United Nations, and financial and military support to the African liberation
movements within these states. 186 The Southern Rhodesia crisis will serve as an illustration
of this category of conflicts.
184
David A. Kay, the Politics of Decolonization: the New Nations and the United Nations
Political Process in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICS AND PROCESS 329 (Leland M.
Goodrich and David A. Kay eds., 1973).
185See OAU Resolutions on Decolonization and Apartheid discussed in Cervenka supra note
113, at 15-18.
186Cervenka reports six strategies adopted by the OAU Liberation Committee to tackle
colonialism:
1
.
to break off diplomatic and consular relations between all African state and the
government of Portugal and South Africa;
2. to introduce an effective boycott of the foreign trade of Portugal and South Africa
by:
a) prohibiting die import of goods from those two countries,
b) closing African ports and airports to their ships and planes,
c) forbidding the planes of those two countries to overfly the territories of all
African states;
3. to establish a co-coordinating Committee consisting of Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Congo, Nigeria, Tanganyika, United Arab Republic and Uganda with headquarters
in Dar es Salaam, responsible for harmonizing die assistance for African and for
managing the Special Fund to be set up for that purpose. The Committee was, in
fact, supposed to become the directing center of operations aimed at die overthrow
of die white minority regimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and die total
liberation of the African continent from die remnants of colonialism;
4. to establish a Special Fund to be raised by voluntary contributions of member
states, to be used for the necessary practical and financial aid to die various African
national liberation movements;
5. to receive on the territories of independent African states nationals from the
liberation movements in order to give diem training in all sectors and afford young
people all assistance they need for their education and vocational training; and
6. to promote in each state the transit of all material aid and the establishing of a
body of volunteers in various fields, with a view to providing die various African
national liberation movements with the assistance they need in various sectors.
Cervenka supra note 1 13, at 15-16
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The Southern Rhodesia Crisis
Perhaps the best potentialities and worst weaknesses of the OAU are revealed in the
Rhodesian crisis. The crisis was triggered by the 1964 Unilateral Declaration of Independence
(UDI) by the Minority Settler community in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) lead by Ian Smith.
It was not a sudden declaration; preparations had been going on for a while. 18 ' The quest for
'independence' by the settler community started immediately after the dissolution of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in March 1963 when the settler community formally
requested independence from Britain. 188 The basis for the settler community's demand for
independence was the 1961 class and racially based constitution that had given the country
defacto self-government with the propertied minority white settlers forming the ruling class
and the poor black people the underdogs. 189
The OAU did not hid its consternation at the events unfolding in Southern Rhodesia.
The Second Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government meeting in Accra
(Ghana) in October, 1965, passed a resolution which recommended the calling of a broad
based constitutional conference that would draft a non-racial constitution. Else the OAU
member states would take the following measures in the event of a non-negotiated
independence:
1
.
refusal to recognize the new Rhodesian government;
2. continued efforts to reconcile the two African nationalist parties _ the Zimbabwe
African People Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
with a view to forming a government in exile and extending to it, financial, political,
diplomatic and military assistance;
3 an emergency meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers to consider further
action including the most effective means of involving the United Nations;
187
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4. call to African members of the Commonwealth and other African countries
to reconsider their relations with Britain and bring the utmost pressure to bear
on the British government; and
5.generally, to treat Rhodesia like South Africa and Portuguese African
teritories in applying such measures as an economic boycott. 190
The Assembly established a committee of five member states to examine the resolution and
take appropriate measures for effective implementation of the resolution. 191 This did not
deter the white minority government from their efforts to gain independence, nor did it stop
them from continuing to emasculate the African nationalist movements. 192 Urban violence
increased as Africans increasingly become frustrated by oppression and discrimination which
permeated every sector of government as the right wing Rhodesian Front party (RFP)
gained more and more support from the settler white community. 193 The worst fears were
confirmed by Ian Smith's flamboyant unilateral declaration of independence in November
1965. 194
It is against this background that the OAU Council of Ministers extraordinary
Session was convened in Lagos (Nigeria). 195 In a no-nonsense resolution, the Council
repeated the earlier calls made by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, called
on the Afro-Asian group in the General Assembly to take appropriate actions to ensure that
Britain adhered fully to the United Nations Resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, and also
190Eze supra note 189, at 55.
m
Id.
192Stephen John Stedman, The End of the Zimbabwean civil War in Stop the Killing
127(Roy Licklider Ed., 1993).
193VULINDLALA MTSHALL RHODESIA BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT 74-88 (1967).
194,G.V.Doxey et aal supra note 188, at 25.
195Eze supra note 189.
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resolved "that if the United Kingdom does not crush the rebellion and restore law and
order, and thereby prepare the way for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia by December 15,
1965, the member states of the OAU shall sever diplomatic relations on that date with the
United Kingdom". 196 The deadline was reached and the OAU's ultimatum was neither
heeded by Britain nor the rebellious Rhodesia. It turned out that the OAU membership was
divided on what action to take. Only nine states implemented the Council of Ministers
resolution.
197
It is difficult to clearly point to the tangible and solid contribution of the OAU to
the resolution of this dispute. However several issues are clear. The OAU's rhetoric and
diplomatic pressure contributed to the isolation and pariah status that the Ian Smith regime
acquired. Its economic sanctions and that of the United Nations greatly contributed to the
realization by the illegal regime that its future was bleak. 198 The Smith regime also in good
time realized that the war against the African guerilla forces that had infiltrated the entire
rural country was unwinnable. 199 There is however no denying that the liberation of
Mozambique from Portuguese colonialism, the consequent ascendancy of an African
independent government to power, and the subsequent closure of the Beirra rail link to the
196
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Several factors explain the OAU's helplessness in dealing Ian Smith's regime, and the
division within the African ranks on what action to to take. A military confrontation between the
African states and the Smith Regime was ruled out - the OAU was ill-equipped to cope with a
conventional warfare with Rhodesia. Economic sanctions could not be strictly enforced because the
neighboring African (Malawi and Zambia), were weak, and their economies were so closely
dependent on Rhodesia that they could ill-afford to impose sanctions on Rhodesia. Secondly,
sanctions were ineffective because Rhodesia had a link to the Sea through South Africa and the
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sea sealed the economic fate of landlocked Rhodesia, putting the last nail to the coffin of
UDI government. 200
On the other hand the polarization of the membership of the OAU as to whether or
not to break diplomatic ties with Great Britain reflected the weaknesses of a house divide
within. Some writers have questioned the legality of the Council of Ministers resolution;
arguing that the Council, under the Charter, has no power to make decisions binding on the
member states and hence the member states had no obligation to implement the
resolution. 201 While, in a legalistic sense this position is correct, this argument does not
absolve the OAU from its responsibility of ensuring that its organs act in unison and make
decisions that members are ready to implement. That is the way to insure the credibility of
the OAU.
d. Internal Conflicts Arising from Secessionist Movements
A number of secessionist movements have sprung up in African post-independent
history. 202They have been hardly successful due to the fact that the OAU, from its very
birth, opposed any attempts at revising the borders existing before independence. 203 This
opposition has been induced by self-interest on the part of the African ruling elite and the
genuine fear that revising the African borders would open a pandoras box and throw the
200Eze supra note 189, at 54.
^Elias supra note 64, at 159.
202 The most memorable ones (discussed in the paragraphs that follow) are the Katanga and
Biafra secessionist provinces of Congo and Nigeria, respectively. See Peter Lyon, The Ending of
Cold War in Africa in CONFLICT IN AFRICA 171-72 (Oliver Furley ed., 1995).
203
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continent into unprecedented instability. 20* So far it is only Eritrea which has successfully
seceded from Ethiopia. 205 The Congo Crisis and the Nigeria civil war will be discussed to
illustrate this category of conflicts.
a. The Congo Crisis
The facts surrounding the Congo crisis are well known. 206 The Congo (later Zaire
and now The Democratic Republic of the Congo), a country rich in mineral resources was
hurriedly granted independence by Belgium in 1960 with Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice
Lumumba as president and Prime Minister, respectively. 207 The paternalistic colonial regime
did little to prepare the Congo for independence, and therefore any keen observer of the
local situation could have foreseen a crisis looming large. 208
The crisis was triggered by the Belgian-sponsored secession of the mineral-rich
Katanga province,209 and subsequent assassination of the left-leaning Lumumba, shortly
204
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206The first Congo crisis was triggered by a secessionist machinations. The second crisis as
shall be shown later, best illustrates how the involvement of superpowers in a local conflict can
complicate the situation and render its resolution at the regional level, indeed even universal level,
daunting. Yashpal Tandon, The Internationalization of Civil wars: Lessonsfrom the Congo,
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after independence. 210 A moderate government led by Aduola that emerged after the demise
of Lumumba, did not last long. Political forces in the Congo were deeply divided despite
the fact that by 1963 the secessionist forces led by Moise Tshombe had given up their bid
for an independent state. 211
By March 1963 the Congo was engulfed in another conflagration. Forces loyal to
the deceased Lumumba regrouped under the name National Liberation Committee (NLC)
and launched an onslaught on the Aduola government from the neighboring Congo
Brazzaville.
212 Moishe Tshombe, with the support of the United States, Belgium and foreign
mercenaries launched his second bid for power. Due to the turmoil that ensued and the
ineffectiveness of his government to contain the situation, Aduola resigned and Tshombe
was sworn in as Prime Minister in July 1964. 213
The turn of evens shocked the OAU. Tshombe was widely regarded as a traitor
responsible for the assassination of Lumumba and the escalation of the crisis by bringing
mercenaries form Rhodesia and South Africa. 214 Small wonder that in October 1964 the
OAU member States threatened to walk out of a Non-aligned movement (NAM) summit
in Cairo (Egypt) should Tshombe be allowed to attend.215
210 The assassination of Lumumba has been closely linked to machinations by the CIA and
Mobutu Seseseko who later took over the country in a bloody coup; see Shuyer infra note 216.
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The C.N.L. forces reacted to the ascendancy of Tshombe to power by launching an
onslaught against government forces and capturing Stanleyville. 216 A bloody civil war
ensued pitting the superpowers against each other with the local protagonists as pawns. The
support of Tshombe by the United States was countered with the backing of C.N.L. by
USSR and to a lesser extent China.217
Attempts by the OAU to resolve the conflict bore no fruits. 218 An extraordinary
session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments met in September 1964 to
discuss the crisis. The Assembly appointed an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of
president Kenyatta of Kenya with a mandate to reconcile the warring parties and normalize
relations between the Congo and its neighbors. The OAU also called for the withdrawal of
foreign mercenaries, the formation of a caretaker government and the holding of
elections.
219
Calls by the OAU went unheeded and initiatives by the Kenyatta committee to
reconcile the factions failed.
220
In the continuing civil war the C.L.N, forces seemed to get
an upper hand over Tshombe 's forces. However the famous Stanleyville operation
effectivelly saw the defeat of C.L.N, forces and the emergence of Tshombe as the de facto
leader. Thanks to the United States', Belgian and British paratroopers. 221
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The OAU thus displayed its impotence in yet another regional conflict. 222 However,
the active involvement of extra-regional forces in this conflict absolves the OAU from any
fair indictment. Indeed, the endorsement of the OAU's call for the withdrawal of
mercenaries by the United Nations Security Council went unheeded, and even the United
Nations peacekeeping forces utterly failed to keep the peace. 223
Moise Tshombe later (in a twist of fate) met his match in the person of Let. Marshal
Mobutu who in a military coup, liquidated all his opponents and installed himself to
power. 224 Mobutu since then presided over a corrupt government, looting and plundering
the resources of Zaire until recently when, rebel forces led by Laurent Kabila launched an
offensive against Mobutu's moribund regime. Mobutu fled to exile in Morocco. 225 Talk of
poetic justice! 226
22The impotence of the OAU can partly be explained by lack of a unified approach at the
beginning of the crisis with the radical states calling for intervention, the conservatives favoring
noninterference in the internal affairs of the Congo, and 'lukewarm' state desiring a middle way. For
more details of the division of the African camp by the Congo crisis see Robert C. Good, Four Views
of the Congo Crisis, 6 AFR. REP. 2 (1961).
223The intractability and complexity of the conflict is best illustrated by the fact that the then
United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammerskerjold lost his life in the Congo while on a peace
mission. See Martyrdom in the Congo, 6 AFR. REP. 3 (1961); ARTHUR LEE BURNS & NINA
Heathcote, Peacekeeping by the United Nations: From Suez to the Congo 23-36 (1963).
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Exteraal intervention made the Congo crisis the most intractable conflicts in Africa. It is
worthwhile to note that the worst dictators in Africa have always received support from western
governments to keep them in power. A respected western weekly Magazine, "The Economist",
makes this sad note:
"The outside powers provided some of the world's most unpleasant regimes
with arms and aid. President Reagan welcomed Mobutu Sese Seko, the
predatory boss of the Zairean kleptocracy, to the White House as a 'voice of
good sense and goodwill,' and decided to 'go with Doe' after Master-Sergeant
Samuel Doe had stolen a spectacularly corrupt election in Liberia. France sent
45
b. The Nigerian Civil War
The Nigerian civil is a microcosm of internal contradictions within the African
nation-state. 227 Nigeria was a country of promise when it gained independence from the
British in I960. 228 It was not only an epitome of hope for Africa in the economic sphere
(being a rich country with abundance oil deposits) but also a showcase in liberal democratic
experimentation. 229 If what an emerging country required was a democratic institutional
base Nigeria had just that; the Federal constitution adopted after independence contained
an elaborate and generous bill of rights. The principles of separation of powers and the rule
of law were deeply ingrained in the federal constitutional order. 230
Yet behind the constitutional facade of democracy and rule of law, seeds of civil
strife were slowly germinating in the political arena
_
the tribal inclination of Nigeria's
political parties underlined the precarious political balance that could be tilted at the
soldiers to sustain incumbent dictators in Franciphone Africa. Britain's
Thatcher played footsie with the white supremacist government in Pretoria,
even after apartheid started to crumble, and dismissed Nelson Mandela's
African National Congress as "a typical terrorist organization." [The
Economist, A Survey of Sub-Saharan Africa, September 7th 19961
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slightest push. 231 The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), was dominated by the
Ibo of Eastern Nigeria, the Northern Peoples party of Nigeria (NPP), by The Hausa of
Northern Nigeria, and the Action Group (AG), by the Yoruba of the Western region. 232 The
federal government was a quasi-national loose coalition of the Ibo and Hausa. 233 Like other
newly independent countries allegiance to the tribe was the norm. Indeed Nigeria was an
amalgamation of tribes and not a nation per se. 234
In January 1966 a military coup detat engineered by Ibo officers took place and the
prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was assassinated. 235 Later Aguiyi-Ironsi (a Ibo) the leader
of the previous coup was executed in a counter-coup that catapulted General Gowon to
power. 236The turn of events was unacceptable to the Itr6~ The military Governor of
Eastern Nigeria Lt. CI. Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the Eastern region an independent
state to be called Biafra. The well known bloody civil war pitting the federal government
and the secessionist Biafra, that lasted for three years and claimed an estimated one million
people, ensued. 238
231John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War: 1967-
1970,4(1977).
^Ntalaja supra note 126, at 71.
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What role did the OAU play in ending this unfortunate conflict? The OAU's capacity
to resolve this conflict was inhibited by its Charter; the principle of non-interference in the
internal affairs of member-states prevented the OAU from going into the bottom of the
crisis.
239 Although the OAU was aware of its impotence it did not want to appear to be
doing nothing while a devastating civil war raged on in an African country. The Assembly
of Heads of State and Governments summit meeting in Kinshasa (Zaire) in September 1967,
therefore discussed the crisis. 240 The resolution that was passed at the end of the conference
emphasized that the conflict was Nigeria's internal affair but placed the "services of the
Assembly at the disposal of the federal government."241 The conference also decided to send
a consultative mission to the head of the federal government to "assure him of the
Assembly's desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria."242
One wonders why the head of the federal government required this assurance from
the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government, since the Assembly was not
139
In reference to why the OAU failed to resolve the Nigerian crisis Tandon gives a summary
of reasons that explains the failure of OAU even in the other African intra-state conflicts. He writes:
"The OAU framework collapsed because of the following factors:
The fust was that the OAU is, by design and constitution, and essentially
conservative organization. It is anti-secessionist, anti-intervennonist, and anu-
border changes. . . .The second weakness of the OAU with reference to the Nigerian
situation was its ability to enforce its decisions on its member states. The OAU
could do nothing to prevent four member states (Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and
Gabo) from recognizing Biafra. The OAU has no sanctions, except those of
collective disapprovation of defaulting states, but even those the OAU was
unprepared to invoke against the four states. . . . The third factor was the weakness
of the OAU with respect to the outside world. Neither the OAU, nor any of its
members, posess the power to insulate African problems from extra-regional
intervention."Yashpal Tandon, The Internalization of Civil war: Lessonsfrom the
Congo, Nigeria and Vietnam in Mazrui et aal supra note 206, at 68.
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fighting to dismember nor was it violating the territorrial integrity of Nigeria. In any case
why send a mission to convey such an assurance; one head of state or a letter to the federal
government would have served the purpose. Whatever logic lay behind this confused
lukewarm response by the Assembly to the Nigerian civil war several issues are apparent.
The tension between the desire to resolve the conflict and at the same time remain faithful
to the OAU Charter explains the Assembly's confused state of mind and unmitigated
diplomatic blunder. By sending the mission to the federal government the OAU ironically,
however, did what it had all along pledged never to do
_
interfere in the internal affairs of
a member state. The unfortunate thing however is that it interfered not as an impartial
umpire bent on genuinely mediating between the parties and ending the conflict, but as a
surpporter of the federal government. This is yet another case of people living in glass
houses and avoiding to throw stones. 243
e. Internal Conflicts Resulting from Challenges to the Legitimacy of the Authority
in Power
Most of the cases examined above manifest this characteristic in addition to the
other traits discussed. A revisiting of the Congo crisis will illustrate this point. The Congo
problem first started as a conflict between the secessionist movement of Moishe Tshombe
against the government of Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu. 244 At this
243
African heads of state (like emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia who was in the forefront of
this Nigerian initiative) acted this in an attempt to preempt similar revolts in their own countries. The
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period there was no regional body within which the African states could launch an initiative.
They therefore acted within the United Nations framework to support a peacekeeping
operation.
245 However when Lumumba was ousted by Kasavubu, the African states become
deeply divided.246 The radical Casablanca group show the ouster of Lumumba as a challenge
to the legitimate authority of the Congo and therefore unacceptable while the conservative
Monrovia group viewed any overt support to a specific group in the Congo as interference
with the internal affairs of the Congo. The African states could not, because of this
polarization, act in concert within the United Nations. 247
When Cyrille Aduola was installed as the successor to Lumumba in 1961, the
situation seemed to improve. The radical states saw him as a legitimate successor to
Lumumba. 248 However his government proved ineffective and the conflict was renewed
when Tshombe supported by the Americans, Belgians and mercenaries invaded from Kivu
and Kilu provinces.249
In reaction to this externally supported offensive C.N.L, forces loyal to the late
Lumumba received direct support from the neighboring states of Congo (Brazzaville),
Burundi, Uganda and the Sudan, while the United Arab Republic (UAR), Algeria and
Ghana supplied it with arms. 250 Majority of the African state leaders questioned the
245
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legitimacy of Tshombe's rulership over the Congo and viewed him as a "neo-colonialist
puppet". 251
Other conflicts like the Sudanese civil war, the Rhodesian crisis, the Namibian civil
war are all conflicts resulting from challenges to the legitimacy of the government in power
although they have other peculiar characteristics mentioned elsewhere. 252
f. Conflicts Involving External Intervention
A number of intra-state conflicts in Africa have involved external intervention either
from within or without Africa. Some African countries in the early years of independence
were accused of interfering in the internal conflicts within the neighboring states. 253 It was
Ghana's alleged involvement in a coup in Togo that prompted the Addis Ababa conference
to incorporate Article III (5) in the OAU Charter. 254 The most famous unilateral
intervention by an African state into another is the Tanzanian 1979 intervention and ouster
of dictator Idi Amin in Uganda. 255 The OAU, through its Liberation commission overtly
gave financial, military aid, and training grounds for rebel groups fighting the last colonial
regimes in Mozambique and Angola as well as the racist white minority regimes in
Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. 256 The latest unilateral involvement by African states
in an internal conflict is the alleged military support by Uganda, Angola, Burundi and
^Gordenker supra note 249, at 1 15.
252See c above and g below.
253See James O. Jonah, The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in THE
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Rwanda of the rebels of Laurent Kabila. Mobutu's use of mercenaries (from the former
Yugoslavia) this time did not change the cause of history; he was eventually ousted by
Kabila's forces. 257 The intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as the
involvement of the great lakes regional states in Burundi conflict is examined elsewhere. 258
During the cold war the East-West conflict manifested itself in Africa through
superpower intervention in African internal conflicts. 259 The Stanleyville operation and the
Russian and Chinese involvement in the Congo crisis has already been mentioned. The
Angolan and Mozambican civil wars have been sustained by the Cuban and Russian support
of the incumbent governments and the sponsorship of the rebel movements in both countries
by the then South African government and the United States. 260 Mention has already been
made of the US and Russian involvement in the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.
France too has numerously unilaterally intervened in its former colonies to save incumbent
governments threatened by a civil war or mutiny. 261
g. Conflicts with Strong Religious and Ethnic Underpinnings
The Hutu-Tutsi conflict within Rwanda and Burundi epitomize conflicts with strong
ethnic angles exacerbated by colonial divide-and-rule policy of playing ethnic groups against
^see supra note 224; Time Magazine, 36-40 (Sept. 1, Vol. 150, No. 9, 1997).
^see Chapter V.
259
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each other. 262 One of the best example of a conflict with both religious and ethnic
undercurrents is the Sudanese civil war. The Sudan is a country ethnically and religiously
divided between the north and the south. 263 The predominantly black, Christian and
"animist'' south took arms shortly after Sudanese independence from joint Egyptian and
British rule in 1956 to fight for autonomy from the Khartoum government which was
controlled by the Muslim and Arabist north. 264 A settlement of the bloody war was reached
in 1972 with the south assuming greater autonomy within a federal system of
government. 265 The war resumed in 1983 when the increasingly fundamentalist government
in Khartoum reneged on the 1972 agreement, adopting Islamic policies like Sharia law and
imposing them on the southerners. 266
The Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) led by Col. John Garang and
other liberation movements in the south have continued to fight what they perceive as
internal colonization by the north dating back to days of slave trade while the Khartoum
government (especially the current regime of Al-Beshir) has, with strong determination
strived to crash what it sees as an insurgency by infidels against Islam. 26 ' With this kind of
polarization a negotiated settlement in the near future is inconceivable. The OAU, through
The Intergovernmental Agency for development (IGAD), a sub-regional body in the horn
262See Generally Neil Weiner, Hutu and Tutsi ofRwanda and Burundi,Netscape,
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of Africa,268 has attempted to mediate an end to the conflict but has avoided direct
involvement for fear of precipitating a fallout (between the Islamic states in the north and
sub-Saharan states) that could destroy the unity within the continental body. 269
D. Assessment of the Role of the OAU in Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement
The performance of the OAU in conflict resolution has been characterized by
modest success in some cases and dismal failure in others. It is important to identify (in a
general fashion) inroads the OAU has made and the challenges it has faced in its general
endeavours at establishing lasting peace in Africa. Internal conflicts have presented the most
daunting challenge to the OAU. The OAU has been helpless in the face of intra-state
conflicts for two reasons. First, where foreign forces have been involved the capacity of the
efforts of the OAU to impact positively on a conflict were substantially eroded. 270 This is
explained by the fact that extraterritorial forces have been too strong for the OAU. For
instance in the Congo crisis the superpower intervention was so pervasive and
overwhelming that the OAU efforts to nullify them proved fruitless.
Secondly, the OAU lacks the power, 'locus standi', so to speak, to intervene in
internal conflicts. The key to understanding the impotence of the OAU in dealing with
internal conflicts is Article IQ (3) which prohibits member states from interfering with
internal affairs of other member states. 271 This provision has been conservatively interpreted
268
IGAD is composed of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea and Somalia. See The
Daily Nation, hrnp://www.africaonlme.co.ke/...onlme/nauon/970707/rn/2.html.
269
1
Jonah supra note 253, at 1 1.
270
Gordenker supra note 249, at 1 15.
271OAU Charter Art. m (2).
54
and applied to place conflicts within a state beyond the purview and jurisdiction of the
OAU. The resulted is an artificial and conceptually unrealistic dichotomy between inter-
state and intra-state conflicts, with the OAU having jurisdiction to deal only with the
former. As is self-evident to any casual observer of the African scene, this distinction is not
realistic. All intra-state conflicts have a trans-border spillover effect that cannot be ignored
by other states. It is therefore (as the above case studies show) impossible for the OAU to
be faithful to this distinction. The OAU intervened in one way or another in all the cases
that could be viewed as internal. The only thing that this distinction does is to enfeeble and
impair the capacity of the OAU to resolve intra-state conflicts without preventing the OAU
from intervening. In the case of Nigeria for example the OAU was unable to stay aloof, but
since the Nigerian federal government insisted that the conflict was a Nigerian internal
affair, to be faithful to this norm, the OAU intervened in support of the federal government.
This way the OAU ironically thought it had insulated itself from being accused of
undermining the sovereign integrity of Nigeria.272
The OAU has however registered success in the sphere of border conflicts;
although this was the area that confronted the OAU with the biggest challenge from the
beginning. 273 It has been admitted that colonial boundaries were arbitrary and
unsatisfactory. 2
'4
Writers and observers of the African scene have nonetheless conceded
that attempts to redraw the map of Africa will invite unprecedented problems and even
more conflicts. The maintenance of the status quo has proven more prudent than opening
272
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a pandora's box by attempting to revise borders. 275 The OAU over the years, has stuck to
this rule in every conflict and the rule has become the norm. 276 The rule has found juridical
expression in the legal doctrine of uti possidetis. 211 The stability with which the colonial
borders have been maintained in Africa is astounding considering "the three wars in Latin
America fought over frontier issues, the wars between India and Pakistan, the 1962 Sino-
India war, and the extra-ordinary carnage of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, which originated
over disputed territory,"278 although some scholars feel otherwise. 279
The role played by the OAU in decolonization cannot be overemphasized. Many
conflicts in Africa were generated by the clash between the African independent states and
liberation movements with the colonial regimes. From its inception, the OAU dedicated
itself to the eradication of all vestiges of colonialism from the continent. 280 Through its
275
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liberation committee, the OAU gave material and military support to the liberation
movements, and at the United Nations level put diplomatic pressure on the United Nations
to Act.
281 For instance Many anti-apartheid resolutions, sanctions on South Africa, 282 and
the resolutions establishing steps towards independence for Namibia were crafted at the
prodding of the OAU members at the United Nations. 283 The OAU has contributed to the
independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 284 With the end of Apartheid in
South Africa it can be said Africa in now free from any form of colonial rule.285
Another significant step is the OAU's effort to contribute generally to peace and
stability in the world through disarmament. It cannot be gainsaid that the presence of highly
sophisticated weaponry in the world has contributed to general insecurity, more so in
Africa. By adopting a convention making Africa a denuclearized zone the OAU has done
two things. 286 One, it has saved Africa from the costs of an arms race. Two, it has charted
a new path in ongoing search for peace and stability based not on militarism but on trust. 287
All conflicts have a human rights dimension; either they are caused by human rights
violations, are triggered by attempts to stop human rights violations, and certainly they
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entail human rights violations. 288 The adoption of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples ' Rights 289_seen in the backdrop of the human rights crisis in Africa caused by
conflicts_ is a milestone in the long road towards establishing a culture of human rights in
Africa_ a prerequisite for peace and stability. The regionalization of human rights through
the adoption of the Charter is a significant step in the human rights movement in Africa, in
that it marks a radical departure from the OAU policy of the 1970s within which issues
pertaining to human rights were seen as internal affairs of member state, hence the OAU
could close its eyes to for example the massacres of tens of thousands of Hutu in Burundi
in 1972 and 1973 and the massive violations of human rights by the notorious regimes of
Jean Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Marcias Nguema of Equitorial
Guinea290 and Idi Amin in Uganda. 291
288Louise Pirouet supra note 102, at 275-94; Oloka-Onyango. Beyond Rhetoric:
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CHAPTER n
THE OAU/UN INTERACTION IN AFRICAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A. The OAU as a Regional Organization Within the Meaning of Chapter VD3 of the
United Nations Charter.
The role played by regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace
and security cannot be overemphasized. This point was not lost in the San Franscisco
conference that drafted the Charter of the United Nations. 292 While there was polarization
between those who favored a universal system and those who desired regional arrangements
within a universal framework,293 the later visionary position won the day when Chapter Vm
was incorporated into the United Nations Charter. Article 52 declares:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters as relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are
consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 294
The independent existence of regional organizations and their competence to deal
with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, cannot be
292For a discussion of the importance the San Francisco conference attached to regional
organizations see RUTH B. RUSSEL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 688-703 (1958); Anthony
Clark Arend, The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Military operations: the Past and
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questioned. The Charter, in no uncertain terms recognizes the legal capacity of regional
organizations to deal with matters relating to regional peace and security, as long as their
activities do not run afoul to the purposes of the United Nations. 295 What is unsatisfactory
however, is that no attempt is made in the Charter to define "regional arrangements or
agencies." An attempt by Egypt to sell a definition was dismissed as too restrictive of
situations that may be covered by regional arrangements. 296 Organizations were therefore left
to themselves to decide whether they qualified to be regional organizations or not.
The question that imposes itself here is whether the OAU is a regional organization.
Where an organization explicitly states in its charter, like the Organization of American States
(OAS), that it is a regional organization, one would have no problem in agreeing that it is;
especially if it performs regional security functions. 297 A situation where the charter of an
organization is silent on this matter like the OAU Charter, or where the Members claim that
their organization is not a Chapter VIQ organization like the NATO members do, is more
problematic. 298
The OAU was formed long after the UN was created. That the founders had the
opportunity to consider its legal status and competencies vis a vis the United Nations is
beyond doubt. The OAU Charter is awash with evidence showing that the drafters grappled
with this question. Firstly, the purposes and principles of the OAU are not disimilar to those
295
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of the United Nations. 299 Secondly, the OAU Charter makes several refences to the United
Nations. The OAU founders were convinced that "the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherance
provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among states. 300 The
commitment of the members of the OAU to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations is further underlined by Article II (l)(e) which states the OAU's goal of promoting
"international cooperation, having due regard to the United Nations Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 301 Article XXVI further provides for the registration
of the OAU Charter (after ratification) with the United Nations Secretariat "in conformity
with Article 102 of the Charter of United Nations."302
There is no question that the founders recognized the primary role of the United
Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Nonetheless, the assertion that
the founders considered the OAU a regional organization yet failed to explicitly state so is
rather curious. It is unbelievable that such an important issue could have escaped the mind
of the Addis Ababa summit. Some writers have interpreted Article 26 to mean that the
founders envisioned the OAU as a regional organization. 303 Article 26 reads as follows:
"This Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with the secretariat of the United
Nations through the Government of Ethiopia in conformity with Article 102 of the United
Nations Charter." Clearly, such an interpretation is far-fetched. Registration of treaties with
the United Nations Secretariat is a requirement of the international law of treaties and has
^See OAU Charter Art.H; U. N. Charter Art.l
.
^^e OAU Charter Preamble.
^The OAU Charter Art. E (1 ) e.
302The OAU charter Art. XXVI.
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nothing to do with nature of the treaty being registered. All treaties, bilateral or multilateral,
irrespective of the nature of legal relations such treaties create are required to be registered
with the United Nations Secretariat.
A more credible explanation of the silence of the OAU Charter as to its legal
relationship with the United Nations is a desire on the part of the OAU to avoid direction and
control by the "extra-African" United Nations Security Council, and therefore preserve it
independence and non-aligned stance. 304 Okoye eloquently argued this point thus:
. . .the point must be made that the Charter of the OAU envisaged the concept
of a regional organization operating independently of the United Nations and
of the Security Council in particular. The general impression is that the OAU
carefully avoided any specific formulations which might remotely suggest that
its activities are subject to United Nations control. Member states are
impatient in their desire for national progress and African advancement and
they are afraid that the United Nations crippled by cold war politics will
frustrate their efforts on such matters as the right to self-determination, and
the struggle against neo-colonialism". 305
The OAU's quest for autonomy and originality of initiative independent of the United
Nations does not however preclude it from being a regional organization for the purposes of
Chapter VHI despite its other stated aims and objectives outside the realm of chapter VEQ.306
Neither does NATO's protestations that it is not a regional organization but a self-defense
arrangement within the meaning of Article 5 1
_
aimed at avoiding being subjected to the
supervisory role of the Security Council
_
make it escape this classification; its self-defense
character notwithstanding. 307 Indeed, the utilization NATO troops by the United Nations for
304Leon Gordenker, The OAU and the UN: can they Live Together, in Mazrui supra note
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enforcement action in the former Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates the duality of NATO (as
a self-defense and regional arrangement), and the flexibility of Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter.
308 Indeed even the European Community (EC), a regional economic organization,
has been drawn into regional dispute settlement and security concerns in the Balkans. 309 This
clearly demonstrates the foresight of those who rejected attempts at defining "regional
arrangements," the result of which could only have been to deny the United Nations Charter
the flexibility necessary in dealing with regional crises like that in the Balkans. From the
foregoing it is sensible and logical to conclude that the term "regional arrangement"
employed in Article 52 of the United Nations Charter is inclusive and was intended to be
elastic enough to denote all multilateral agencies of a regional character whose competencies
encompass but are not necessarily restricted to dealing regional peace and security. The OAU
is therefore a regional organization the silence of its Charter notwithstanding.
B. OAU-UN Involvement in African Conflict Resolution and Peace Making: Tackling
Jurisdictional Bottlenecks
The United Nations and the OAU have co-existed for over three decades. It is
important to examine how these two organizations have related over the years, especially
given the fact that although the OAU Charter recognizes the importance of the United
Nations and pledges to promote the purposes of the United Nations, no formal legal
relationship between the two bodies is envisioned by their respective charters. Indeed the
OAU (as already mentioned) has over the years seen itself as an autonomous regional
308Meyer supra note 293, at 431.
309Borgen supra note 298, at 809.
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organization always taking with a pitch of salt any interaction with the Security Council that
may lead credence to the view that it is a subordinate actor in the regional scene.310
This does not in any way mean that the United Nations and the OAU have had an
uneasy relationship. Far from that. The relationship between the United Nations and the OAU
has always been cordial and warm; manifesting itself in resolutions by both organizations and
various forms of mutual cooperation between the two organizations that have evolved over
the years. In 1963 the OAU, through a resolution termed "Africa and the United Nations,"
the member states of the OAU expressed their commitment "to strengthen and surpport the
United Nations". 311 The African states underlined their conviction that the "United Nations
is an important instrument for the maintenance of peace and security among nations and for
the promotion of economic and social advancement of all peoples."312 Another resolution
adopted at the Nineth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and approved by the
Assembly of Heads of States in 1967 spelt out the principles of the OAU policy in dealing
with the United Nations and its specialized agencies.313
Of practical importance however is the cooperation the United Nations and the OAU
have charted out in the social and economic fields. The work of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa that has been critical in the development of Africa, was
commenced with a special agreement between the OAU and the United Nations. 314 The
OAU adopted in 1980 Lagos plan of Action (LPA) for the economic development of Africa,
a comprehensive document detailing the strategies for Africa's economic development to the
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311
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year 2000.315 In 1985 the OAU adopted a revised and a more down-to-earth version of the
Lagos Plan, the "African Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER). 316 The United
Nations General Assembly, in support of this initiative, approved the "United Nations
Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD)" in
support of the OAU initiative. 317
Examples are a legion of UN-OAU cooperation in the socio-economic field. Of
particular concern for this thesis, however, is the UN-OAU cooperation in conflict resolution
and peace making. The charters of both organizations invest them with the authority to deal
with conflicts and settle disputes. 318 While the OAU mandate is restricted within the
geographical land mass occupied by the OAU members, the United Nation's mandate is
universal. Hence not only do the membership of both organizations overlap, but also their
respective jurisdictions in dealing with conflicts.
The United Nations Charter of course attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of regional
organizations to the utilization of peaceful means for regional dispute settlement, and retains
the monopoly of use of force, the so-called enforcement measures for the Security Council. 319
The United Nations Charter also attempts to create an hierarchy of sorts between regional
instruments of pacific settlement of disputes and the security Council. The member states are
called upon to "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security
315 See Berhanukun Andemicael, OAU-UN Relations in a Changing World in THE
Organization of African Unity After Thirty Years, 1 30 (Yassin El-Ayouty, ed. 1994).
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Council."320 The security Council is therefore a tribunal of last resort after "exhausting local
remedies," so to speak.
These provisions however do not clarify conclusively the issue of computation of
jurisdiction between the United Nations and regional mechanisms. 321 At what point is the
Security Council expected to intervene in a local dispute? One might answer: after the
disputants have made every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through
regional arrangements. How is the Security Council to determine every effort has been made
and regional arrangements have failed to resolve a dispute? And what is a local dispute? Or
to put it in another way what disputes are not local? Do these provisions mean the Security
Council or the Secretary General has no power to utilize "good offices" for resolution of
local disputes when regional agencies are undertaking similar initiatives, or even when
regional agencies have not gotten involved? There are no easy answers to these questions.
What is clear however, is that nothing in the United Nations Charter prevents the
Security Council or the Secretary-General from being involved in a dispute at any stage.
Indeed, Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter empowers the Security Council to assist
in the resolution of conflicts through peaceful means. The Security Council "may call upon
the parties to settle their disputes by such means, and may investigate any dispute or any
other situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute."322 That
regional organizations do not have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes "appropriate for
320The U.N. Charter Art. 52 (2).
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regional action," (assuming it is possible to determine what such disputes are), was
underlined by none other than Dag Hammarskjold:
The importance of regional arrangements in the maintenance of peace and
security is fully recognized in the Charter and the appropriate use of such
arrangements is encouraged. But in those cases where resort to such
arrangements is chosen in the first instance, that choice should not be
permitted to cast any doubt on the ultimate responsibility of the United
Nations.323
The short and long of this is that in many instances the United Nations and regional
organizations have ovelapping jurisdictions over regional disputes and one can imagine
scenarios of tension between the two organizations if both assert their respective jurisdiction
over a dispute.
324
It is interesting to see how this anomalous situation has been avoided by
the OAU and the United Nations in their various efforts to resolve conflicts and settle
disputes in Africa. Depending on the nature of the dispute a mondus vivendi has been evolved
between the United Nation and the OAU to avoid tension and friction that any form of
competition for jurisdiction may generate.
i. The United Nations Deferrence to the OAU.
The wisdom of deferring to regional organizations by the security Council lies in the
recognition that regional agencies have intimate knowledge and understanding of the
intricacies of local conflicts and are hence better suited to fashion out appropriate remedies.325
The Security Council has, in appropriate cases, more often than not deferred to the OAU
323Aida L. Levin, The OAS and the UN: Relations in the Peace and Security Fields
45(1974).
324A case in point was the tension created between the United Nations and the Organization
of American States (OAS) in 1965 when both organizations competed for jurisdiction over the crisis
in the Dominican Republic. Henrikson supra note 276, at 47-48.
325Meyer supra note 293, at 410.
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when a dispute has been refered to it, a practice that has politically been dubbed "try the
OAU first. "African countries have also tried their best to give African problems African
solutions.
326
Examples of this practice abound. When Morocco decided in 1962 to submit its
border conflict with Algeria to the Security Council, it was persuaded by her allies within the
Security Council to seek a settlement within the OAU first. 327 Similarly, Somalia was
prevailed upon to withdraw its petition before the Security Council dealing with its border
conflicts with Kenya and Ethiopia, until the OAU had adjudicated the dispute. In the Western
Sahara conflict the Security Council deferred to the OAU by calling upon the protagonists
to cooperate to the fullest with the OAU in its effort to settle the conflict. 328 The United
Nations Kept its hands off the 1967-70 Nigeria civil war mainly due to the fact that the OAU
was already involved on the side of the federal government.329 In a nutshell the Security
Council has over the years shown a lot of reluctance to deal with African border conflicts
before the OAU has delt with them, or when the OAU is seized of the matter. 330
ii. Concurrent Exercise of Jurisdiction
Other than deferring to the OAU there are many other occasions when the United
Nations and the OAU have jointly attempted to deal with a conflict on an equal footing and
instances when the United Nations has taken an upper hand and relegated the OAU to the
326See Henrikson supra note 276.
327
Layachi supra note 1 5 1 , at 151.
328 S.CRes. 658, U.N. SCOR, 2929th MTG., U.N. Doc. S/RES/658 (1990).
329
See Stremlau supra note 231, at 129.
330See Berhanykun Andemicael, The Organization ofAfrican Unity and the United
Nations: Relations in the Peace and Security Field, in REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS
238, 254-56 (Berhanykun Andemicael ed., 1979).
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backstage. The United Nations and the OAU were jointly involved in peacekeeping
operations in both the Congo and Chad, and the United Nations joined the OAU in
condemning super power intervention in the former. 331 The latest example of a situation
where the United Nations and the OAU have delt with a conflict in a more or less equal
footing is the recent civil war in Zaire pitting the rebels of Laurent Kabila and the government
of dictator Mobutu Seseseko. The Unite Nations and the OAU appointed a
joint peace envoy in the name ofMohamed Sahoun to mediate over the conflict and work out
the modalities of a cease-fire. 332 Both organizations adopted the three point peace plan
proposed by the mediator upon which the peace negotiations in Pretoria (South Africa) were
based.333
The Western Sahara conflict is a classic example of a dispute where the OAU is at
first predominantly involved, but gradually its role diminishes as that of the Security Council
and the General Assembly increases. The involvement of the OAU started to decline at the
point when the OAU officially admitted the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) into
the OAU. Morocco, one of the protagonists in the conflict rejected OAU mediation in the
conflict pointing out that the OAU, after admitting SADR was no longer an impartial
umpire. 334 It is however worth noting that the three point formula formulated by the OAU
331R . A. Akindele, The Organization of African Unity and the Promotion of
World Peace: a Study of Universal-Regional Systems 98-102 (1976).
332The Daily Nation, Monday April 28, 1997.
33V
334 See Naldi supra note 148, at 152.
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special committee reverberates at the Security Council and General Assembly level, and is
implicitly supported by the decision of the International Court of Justice.335
The United Nations has also played a pivotal role in the resolution of conflicts related
with decolonization such as the Namibian and South African (apartheid) conflict. 336 However,
although the steps leading to the resolution of these peculiar conflicts (especially the
Namibian one ) were crafted at the United Nations level, it would be wrong to assert that the
OAU played a backstage role. While the OAU member states concentrated their diplomatic
efforts to resolve these conflicts at the United Nations arena, at the OAU level they adopted
a strategy envisioned in the OAU Charter_ giving material, military and logistical support to
national liberation movements involved in these conflicts
,
337
for the "total emancipation of
African territories which are still dependent."338
From the foregoing, it is difficult to identify hard and fast rules on which the OAU
and the United Nations have based their relationship in exercising their overlapping
jurisdictions to resolve African conflicts. It is safe, however, to conclude that a pragmatic
approach_ based on the nature of the dispute and the practical realities of the day _ has
dictated the nature of the partnership between the United Nations and the OAU in resolving
African conflicts.
335See Chapter I (B)(1)(b).
336
For a detailed discussion of the involvement of the United Nations in resolving the South
African conflict see Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity ofEach Human Being:
The United Nations NGOs and Apartheid 19 FORDHAM INTR'L L. J. 1464 (1996).
337
Gordenker supra note 249, at 1 12.
338OAU Charter Art.m (6).
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C. Utilization of United Nations Mechanisms for Resolution of African Conflicts:
Problems and Prospects
1. The Security Council
Resort to the Security Council is one avenue the OAU may consider in resolving
African conflicts. In this regard, whenever the OAU wishes to undertake an enforcement
action against a regional threat to peace, it will submit its resolution to the Security Council
for a stamp of approval. 339 Alternatively, a member-state or the OAU collectively may submit
a conflict to the jurisdiction of the Security Council for it to take a decision as to whether
or not enforcement action under Chapter VII or other measures under Chapter VI is
appropriate for such a conflict.340 Various shortcomings of the Security Council will however
caution the OAU against relying on the Security Council to guarantee peace and security in
Africa.
Firstly, a danger of a deadlock within the Security Council is real, with one or more
of the permanent members using its veto power to block a Security Council decision, if it is
in the geopolitical interest of such a member or members so to do. 341 Especially now after the
end of the cold war when the hegemonic dominance of the United States prevails in the
Security Council, one expects any decision that does not advance Washington's perceived
339
Article 53 of the United Nations Charter prohibits regional organizations from taking
"enforcement measures" without Security Council authorization.
340Member states of the United Nations are obligated, under Article 37, to refer disputes that
they are unable to settle by peaceful means to the Security Council.
^Borgen writes: The dilemma of deadlock arises when a regional organization wishes to
undertake an enforcement action but is unable to get security Council approval because: a. The
Security Council stays silent as to whether or not a given situation is a threat to international peace
and security, or b. Security Council members believe that any attempt officially to label the situation
as such would result in a veto. Borgen supra note 298, at 802.
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foreign policy, to be blocked.342 Once the OAU submits a conflict to the Security Council the
competence to resolve the conflict henceforth devolves in the Security Council. Hence the
Security Council retains the keys to the resolution of the conflict and may use the keys to
resolve the conflict or may keep it in its locker, letting the conflict continue unresolved.343
That the Security Council as presently constituted suffers from a democratic deficit
and a crisis of legitimacy is beyond doubt. 344 While welcoming a more revitalized Security
Council that is able to carry out its mandate under the United Nations Charter, the small
states that form the majority in the United Nations object at what they see as an exercise of
raw power by the United States within the framework of the Security Council. Professor
Gassama puts this state of affairs in an historical perspective thus:
During the Cold War, the potential for abuse of these powers and their
essentially undemocratic nature was not at issue. Indeed, the key concern then
was the Council's inability to act on controversial matters since the hostility
between East and west virtually assured institutional paralysis. Permanent
members on the Council routinely frustrated the resolution of most major
global issues. This institutional paralysis, however also meant that the Security
Council did not interfere in the affairs of smaller members of the organization.
Today, with the Security Council increasingly disposed to following U.S.
leadership, smaller nations are becoming more concerned about the Council's
powers, independence, and accountablity. Many of these nations now
342
Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and
Beyond, 15 MICH.J. INT'LL. 519, 581 (1994).
^See U.N. Charter Art. 25 & Chapter VH.
3440ne of the ironies of the United Nations system is that the Security Council that has in the
recent past sought to promote democracy by interveninng in some states like Haiti to restore a
democratic regime to power, lacks democratic credetials of its own. Many writers and commentators
are now questioning the credibility and legitimacy of the Council. See David Bills, International
Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: the ramifications of reform on the United Nations'
Security Council, 31 TEX. INT'L J. 107, 117 (1996); Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council,
Legitimacy and the concept of Collective Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 201, 247 (1994)
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advocate changes to the council that would make it more representative
of the membership of the United Nations. 345
It is not just the small states that acknowlegde the need for reforming the Security
Council. Big states including the United States have owned up to the need for overhauling
the Security Council to reflect the present day reality. 346 Indeed, with the publication of the
United Nations Secretary-General Report's, An Agenda for Peace , by the immidiate former
Secretary-General, underlining the need for such reforms,347 and the appointment of a
Working Group on the reform of the Security Council, a consensus in the international
community on the inevitability of reform seems to have been reached.348
The crux of the matter, however, is determing in specific terms the nature of the
reforms desired by the community of nations. A plethora of proposals have been put forward
depending on what the proponents of these proposals feel are the fundamental flaws within
the Security Council and the nature of the changes they discern will address these
shortcomings. Some Scholars have argued that during the Cold War East-West division
dominated the United Nations, but with the collapse of communism, and the end of the Cold
War, we now have a North-South conflict (other than East-West divide) dominating the
United Nations. 349 Hence, they Argue, a reformed Security Council must reflect this North-
South division. The status quo characterized by Northern dominance, they argue, is
^^rahim J. Gassama, World Order in the Post-cold War Era: The Relevance and the
Role of the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 255, 318 (1994).
346
See David Bills. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: the
Ramifications ofReform on the United Nation's Security Council 31 TEX. NTER. L. J. 107, 117
(1996).
34
'United Nations Report of the Secretary-General on An Agenda for Peace
_
Preventive
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, June 17 1992, 31 I. L. M. 953 (1992).
^G.A. Res. 26, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No.49, 29 U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
349
Bills supra note 346, at 1 19.
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unpalatable.
350 Some scholars have advocated for the scrapping of the veto power, since in
their view veto power only serves to undermine the principle of sovereign equality of states
upon which the international law edifice is predicated, and instead of buttressing the rule of
law, goes to emphasize that might is right. 351
Others would like to see the one-state-one-vote system in both the General Assembly
and Security Council replaced by a weighted System whereby state representation in both of
these organs would be directly proportional to the population in a given state and the
financial contribution such a state makes to the United Nations. 352 A regionalized Security
Council representation is another proposal espoused by some scholars who argue that the five
permanent members in the Security Council were given permanent status following their
victory in the World War n. 353 The continued possession of veto power by some of these
States is anachronistic in the sense that it does not reflect the present day reality on the global
distribution of military and economic power. 354 Further more, they argue, the defining
characteristics of what constitutes threats to peace have shifted from global military capability
to local situations directly linked to poverty and deprivation. Therefore, in their opinion,
incorporating regional economic superpowers in a reformed Security Council makes a lot of
sense.
355 For instance India and Japan would represent the Asian Continent while Latin
America would be represented by Brazil, Western Europe by Germany and Africa by Egypt,
South Africa or Nigeria. Veto power would be extended to these regional powers in addition
3S0
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351/<f.atl20.
,52Gassama supra note 344, at 307.
,53Gordon supra note 342, at 585.
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to the five permanent members who already posses it; since it would be difficulty to convince
Great Britain and France whose possession of veto power no longer seems justified, to give
it up.
356
Some scholars have even gone further to propose 'direct universal suffrage' for state
representatives in the United Nations organs. 357 The incumbent President of the United
Nations General Assembly who is also the chairman of the Working Group on Security
Council reform has proposed a three-tier system with the first tier consisting of the present
five permanent members retaining the veto power, and a second tier of five states, three from
the developing regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and two from the
industrialized countries. 358 The second-tier states would have permanent status but no veto
power. A third tier would consist of four rotational members elected every five years akin to
the present ten non-permanent members to be derived each from Africa, Asia, Latin America,
Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean. 359
While it is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss the merits and demerits of
these proposals, a few important points need to be noted. Any reform of the Security Council
that does not address the genuine concerns of the developing countries that form the majority
of the members of the United Nations will not resolve the credibility and legitimacy crisis
currently engulfing the United Nations Security Council. More specifically a restructuring of
the Security Council that preserves the veto power exclusively for the current five permanent
members like the proposed three-tier system is an exercise in window-dressing which does
not deal with the bottomline of the desired reforms; that is, the removal of superpower
356See Gassama supra note 344, at 321.
357/rf.at316.
,58
Panafrican News Agency, http://www.africanews.org/PANA/news/970321/feat6.html.
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syndrome by making the Security Council a more representative body. 360 However care must
be taken not to over-expand the Security Council. A security Council that is too large is
bound to be unwieldily and inefficient in carrying out its mandate. 361 And since it is not
possible to call another San Francisco conference, the General Assembly is the right forum
to discuss and adopt the requisite reforms, in accordance with Article 108 of the United
Nations Charter.
A genuine spirit of striving for fundamental reforms that will serve the ends of peace,
stability and justice, captured in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations
_
other
than political expediency and self-interest
_
should permeate the discussions leading to the
reforms. The immediate former Secretary General of the United Nations underlined this new
spirit that must inform relations and intercourse within the United Nations system in the
following words:
a genuine sense of consensus deriving from shared interests must govern the
work of Council, not the threat of a veto or power of any one group of
nations. Moreover, the permanent members must have the deeper support of
other members of the Council, and the membership more widely, if the
council's decisions are to be effective and endure. 362
2. The International Court of Justice (I.C.J).
The international Court of Justice is another universal institution that the OAU
members state could have recourse to in the resolution of conflicts and disputes inter se. It
is an avenue whose potentialities have hardly been explored since the existing OAU conflict
360
Indeed Italy criticized the proposal, saying "we cannot accept a system that attempts to
benefit the very few by taking away from the great many, in blatant disregard for the principles of
sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter." Id.
361Murphy supra note 344, at 264.
362Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peacekeeking 15 Par. 78 (1992).
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resolution and dispute settlement structures and the practice of its member states generally
seem to be bent in favor of informal means and diplomatic resolution as opposed to juridical
modes of resolution of disputes and conflicts. 363 Some scholars have found explanations for
this supposedly African (and Asian too) scepticism displayed towards the international Court
of Justice rooted in the African (and Oriental) cultures which prefer negotiation and
consensus as the ideal modes of dispute resolution, and look with disfavor juridical resolution
of disputes. 364
Such assertions (with due respect to their proponents) have no scientific basis since
empirical evidence exist to show that informal mechanisms of dispute resolution based on
negotiation and consensus co-existed with indigenous courts administering indigenous justice
in pre-colonial African and Asian societies. 365 African and Asian states have avoided the
International Court of Justice for historical reasons that have nothing to do with Afro-Asian
cultures, but every thing to do with the culture of the international Court of Justice itself.366
The African (and Asian) states emerged from colonial subjugation to find themselves
overburdened with onerous duties and obligations in the international regime deriving from
"principles by which the Western powers agreed to live and conduct their business."367 In
other words the newly independent states, propelled into the international law edifice
suddenly found themselves having to abide by norms of classical international law made by
363
Asante supra note 35 1
.
K..P. Anand. Attitudes of the "New' Asian African Countries Towards the International
Court ofJustice in Snyder et aal supra note 135, at 163.
36
Tt is these court the colonial authorities, unable to administer western justice to the natives
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Anand supra note 364, at 164-65.
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and skewed in favor of Western states. 368 The composition of the International Court of
Justice with judges from the Western countries, and the practice of these judge that was
directed at perpetrating vested interests of the western states, served to alienate the Afro-
Asian states from the International Court of Justice, which they viewed as a Western
institution designed to serve Western interests and far removed from the realities of the
problems affecting the newly independent states. 369
The Court was presented with an opportunity to correct this image of itself from the
African states on November 4, 1960 when the governments of Liberia and Ethiopia filed, in
the Court registry, applications instituting proceedings against South Africa in the famous
South West African Cases . 370 Preliminary objections raised by South Africa touching on the
jurisdiction of the Court and the legal standing of the petitioners were dismissed by the Court;
finding that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute and the applicants
had locus standi before the court. 371 The court then went to deal with the substantive issues
in the merit stage of the case ( South West African case. Second Phase) . 372 The following is
a summary of the main issues that were in contention between the parties:
1. Whether South West Africa was still a territory under mandate and if so
whether the mandatory obligation to furnish annual reports on its
administration to the Council of the League had been replaced by an obligation
so to report to the General Assembly of the United nations.
368
P. Kenneth Kiplagat, Legal Status of Integration Treaties and the Enforcement of Treaty
Obligations: a look at the COMESA Process 23 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 259, 262 (1995).
369Anand supra note 420. at 166.
370
See Krystyna Marek, a Digest of the Decisions of the International Court vol.
11,718 (1978) for analysis of the Court's judgement and the historical background of the territory of
South-West Africa see L.C. Green, South West-Africa and the World Court, 22 INT'L J CANADIAN
LNSTTTUTE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, 39-67 (1966-67).
37V at 728.
372 (Rep. Of S. Afr. v. Ethiopia & Liberia) 1966 1. C. J. 6.
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2. Whether in keeping with the mandate, the Republic of South Africa had
promoted to the utmost the material and moral well being and the social
progress of the inhabitants of the territory.
3. Whether the mandatory had, by acts and/or declarations, violated a number
of provisions in the mandate, in particular, following a policy of racial
segregation, by establishing military and naval bases and by creating
administrative structures which amount to a unilateral modification of the terms
of the mandate.
4. Whether by attempting to modify the Mandate without the consent of the
United Nations General Assembly, the legal successor of the Council of the
League for this and other purposes, South Africa had violated the provisions
in the Mandate that the mandate can only be modified with the consent of the
Council of the League of Nations.373
Sadly, this opportunity slipped through the hands of the Court when in its 1966
judgement, in a streak of ultra-conservatism the International Court of Justice delivered
what has been righdy described as a "legalistic, restrictive and narrow ruling."374 The court's
majority "resort to a restrictive or literal treaty interpretation and to legal quibbles had
resulted in technical dismissal of the applicant states' case."375 The Court ruled that Ethiopia
and Liberia had locus standi [ "the legal standing before the court itself '] before the court,376
but no legal right to receive judgement [ "legal right or interest appertaining to them in the
subject-matter of the present claims"]. 377 The court thus by creating a nuance between legal
standing and subject matter interest, an issue all the parties thought the court had
conclusively dealt with at the preliminary stage, was able to avoid dealing with the substance
of the application.
373(Rep. Of S. Afir. v. Ethiopia & Liberia) 1966 1. C. J. 6, 10-16.
374
Elias supra note 1 18, at 75.
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3761966LC.J.6, 18.
3771966I.C.J.6,50.
79
The alienation of the African states from the International Court of justice by this
ruling is obvious. This was not the only time the Court had failed to rise to the occasion and
contribute to the positive development of international law. 378 A commentator harshly (but
rightly) indicts the Court thus:
The international Court is said to have successfully alienated the Eastern bloc
on (Corfu Channel case), the Latin American on (The Asylum and Haya de la
Torre cases) and the Asians on (the Temple of Preah Viheah and Rights of
Passages cases). There can be little doubt that the South West African cases
have turned the African states from mere alienation to total disenchantment
with the International Court. The Court could probably be called by the
radical sceptics no less than the moderates, the "Western European Court of
Justice," determined to give legal protection to the colonial and imperial
interest of Southern Africa. Whether this attitude is induced by temporary
frustration remains to be seen. The real tragedy is that the International Court
has probably abdicated any capacity it ever had to contribute towards the
resolution of Conflict between nations by means other than violence. 379
Such criticism was deserving of the International Court before and in the 1960s. Its
composition and perhaps the substance of its rulings have undergone some change to
warrant some caution in overly criticizing it or at least to make such criticism mild. The
General Assembly in 1968 changed the composition of the Court to reflect "the main forms
of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world,"380 by electing two Africans
3 ' 8
In the Northern Cameroons case the Court refused to "adjudicate upon the merits of the
claim of the Republic of Cameroon, " since the amalgamation of Northern Cameroons and The
Federation of Nigeria was a fait accompli, and therefore the "any judgement which the court might
pronounce would be without object." Great Britain under the Mandate system of the league of
Nations and the Trusteeship system of the United nations, had administered the territories of
Southern and Northern Cameroons as part of the colony and protectorate of Nigeria. By way of two
referendums administered by the United Nations General Assembly, Southern and Northern
Cameroon decided to join the Republic of Cameroon (formerly under French rule) and the Federation
of Nigeria, respectively. The new Republic of Cameroon was unhappy with the results of the
plebiscite in Northern Cameroon and sought a "declaratory" opinion from the Court. Case
Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) 1963 I. C. J. 15, 37.
379Okoye supra note 87, at 203.
380
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judges to the Court. 381 Africa was hitherto unrepresented. 382 The International Court of
Justice has therefore gained some stature and popularity.383 In fact the international Court
of Justice of late seems to have enhanced its popularity among African states as the right
forum for resolving inter-state conflicts, especially boundary disputes. The Opinion delivered
by the Court on Western Sahara can be cited as a landmark ruling on issues touching on Africa's
colonial past.
384 The Court's ruling ordering provisional measures in the case concerning the border
conflict between Mali and Burkina Faso seems to have resolved the devastating conflict between these
two neighboring states. 385 The Libya/Chad Border conflict too has been settled by the International
Court of Justice. 386
Nonetheless certain quarters still feel there is need for reforms to make the
International Court of Justice a truly "principal judicial organ of the United Nations,"387 that
can contribute to the "clarification and development"388 of international law, and avoid the
retrogressive practice of having "to apply the law as it finds it, not to make it," as happened
381 See the International Court of Justice Yearbook 1968-69, no. 23 (The Hague:
LC.J.. 1969) P.3.
382
For information pertaining to the composition of the Court between 1946 and 1996 see
arthur witteveen, the international court 1946-19%, 370-3.(kluwer law
International, 1996)
383Edward Macwhinney, Judicial Settlement of International Disputes 122
(1991).
384
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385
See Order on Provisional Measures in the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina
Faso/Mali, I.C.J., (1986), 25 I.L.M. 146 (1986).
386
See the Case Concerning the territorial Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), I.C.J.,
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 571 (1994).
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in the South West Africa cases. 389 In Particular some scholars and commentators have been calling
for the empowerment of the International Court of Justice by scrapping the optional clause [Article 36
(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice] and expanding the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court
390 While these proposals are very sensible and necessary if the court is to be a truly global
judicial body, it is doubtful whether the United Nations member states are ready at this point in the
history of the development of the international legal system to confer to the 'world court' inherent
jurisdiction akin to the jurisdiction enjoyed by municipal courts.
389A portion of the Courts judgement reads: "... the Court is not a legislative body. Its duty
is to apply the law as it finds it, not to make it." 1966 I. C. J. 6, 47.
3900koye supra note 87, at 203; Gassama supra note at 323.
CHAPTERm
LIMITATIONS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION
AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AFRICA
The limitations that have impeded or checked the capacity of the OAU to effectively
resolve regional conflicts are located within and without the OAU. Hence the
compartmentalization of this discussion into Charter-based limitations and obstacles,
denoting the conceptual, normative and structural improprieties within the OAU Charter on
the one hand, and non-charter based problems
_
meaning external factors such as budgetary
problems and political inertia, that are not attributable to the OAU per se but are products
of the economic and political milieu within which the OAU operates, on the other hand.
A. Charter-based Limitations and Obstacles
Perhaps the best approach in the exploration of the Charter-based limitations and
obstacles is to go back to the conception of the OAU. Two visions informed the process and
permeated the Addis Ababa conference that drafted the Charter of the OAU. The first vision
most prominently advocated by the late President Nkrumah of Ghana, conceived of a unitary
government, a united state of Africa, that would be able to overcome the historical internal
contradictions in Africa and check external forces. 391 For Dr. Nkrumah this was the only way
to guarantee the security, independence and prosperity for Africa. He eloquently painted his
vision thus:
Our essential bulwark against such sinister threats and the other multifarious designs
of the neocolonialist is in our political union. If we are to remain free,
391Opoku Agyema, Nkrumah's Ghana and East Africa 31 (1992).
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ifwe are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa's rich resources, we must unite
to plan for our total defense and the full exploitation of our material and
human means, in the full interests of our peoples. To go it alone will limit our
horizons, curtail our expectations, and threaten our liberty . . . Unless we
meet the obvious and very powerful neocolonialist' threats with a unified
African front, based upon a common economic and defense policy, the
strategy will be to pick us off and destroy us one by one. '392
The second vision conceived by the Monrovia group of states and best advocated by
Nigeria, thought of an amalgamation of African states into a continental body based on equal
sovereignty of all states, dealing with issues of common concern:
Nigeria's stand is that if we want unity in Africa, we must first agree to
certain essential things. The first is that African states must respect one
another. There must be acceptance of equality by all states. No matter
whether they are big or small, they are sovereign and their sovereignty is
sovereignty.
The Charter that emerged from the conference was therefore necessarily a
compromise document representing both world views of Africa, but with the second vision
forming the core of the Charter. Like all compromise documents tailored to meet political
expediency,394 rather than designed to confront the problems and challenges facing the
continent, the OAU Charter, most scholars agree, lost its cutting edge. 395
However, to attribute the weaknesses of the OAU only to its origin and process of
creation is to paint a partial picture of the problem. The OAU is a creature of international
law and the weaknesses of the OAU are by and large those of the international legal system
l92Kwame Nkmmah, Africa Must Unite p. xvii (1985) quoted in Shridath Rahphal, The
Legacy ofKwame Nkrumah in ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: 25 YEARS ON, 1 (Kwesi Krafona
ed., 1988).
393Agbi supra note 1 18, at 1 16.
John Marcum, How wide is the Gap Between Casablanca and Monrovia, 7 AFR. REP. 3
(1962).
l95
See Thomas Nsenga Kanza, Africa Must Change in ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY:
25 YEARS ON, 146 (Kwesi Krafona ed. 1988); W. Scott Thompson & Richard Bissel, Legitimacy
and Authority in the OAU, 15 AFR.STUD. REV. 27 (1972).
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itself. International law has over the centuries exalted the concept of sovereignty as the
bedrock of relations between nations.396 State borders were considered sacrosanct and any
attempt by a state to, in any way, exert influence over what happens within another states
borders was considered contrary to international law and frowned upon. 397 The international
organizations that emerged were therefore loose associations of sovereign states designed
and geared towards promoting the essential and minimum international relations without
offending the tenet of sovereign equality between member states. The Member states still
functioned as self-contained units with the real power of decision-making. Frey-wouters
eloquently captures the weakness inherent in regional organizations due to this flawed
conceptualization of international relations, in the following words:
The limited character of existing regional institutions shapes their response to
internal conflict. The decision-making process of the Organization of
American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the League of Arab
States is of an intergovernmental character. There is no supranational regional
center of power above the member states; the regional system is limited to
direct interaction between the power centers of the member units. The
regional secretariats are merely administrative organs, exercising no executive
power and entrusted with little scope for independent initiative."398
,%
Classical definition of sovereignty is provided by Jean Bodin as "the absolute and
perpetual power" within a single states boundaries. [JEAN BODIN, SK BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 25 (C.H. WILSON & R.B. McCALLUM EDS., M.J. TOOLEY TRANS., BASIL
BLACKWELL 1955) (1576)]. Although the concept of state sovereignty has evolved over the years,
starting from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1 648, the modern concept of sovereignty still poses
monumental problems, see CAROLINE THOMAS, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION
(1985).
The crisis of the OAU is therefore to a large extent the crisis of international law itself, as
it grapples with the challenge of confronting the realities of the ever changing nature of the subjects
and objects of international relations. Grossman and Bradlaw capture this crisis when they write
"The deficiencies of the present international legal order based on the de jure sovereignty of the
nation-state and a relatively clear distinction between the international and domestic legal issues are
obvious. The nation-state is no longer functionally "the master of its own territory.""_ Claudio
Grossman & Daniel Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered Transnational
Legal Order?, 9 AM.U.J.lNT'L L. & POL'Y 1 , 22 (1993).
398
Frey-wouters supra note 107, at 460.
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The founders of the OAU were therefore simply paying homage to international law by
incorporating classical international law norms into the OAU Charter. An examination of the
normative and institutional structure of the OAU will throw more light into this discussion.
1. Conceptual and Normative Weaknesses
The classical international law principle of sovereign equality of all states enshrined
in Article HI (1) of the OAU Charter forms the core of the normative structure of the
OAU. 399 All other norms only serve to reinforce this 'grundnorm', so to speak. The principle
of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and the prohibition of subversive
activities are geared towards the protection of state sovereignty.400 Additionally, the OAU
Assembly of Heads of State and governments and the Council of Ministers have over the
years passed many resolutions aimed at safeguarding state sovereignty. It is understandable,
as Prof. Borella observes, that the infant OAU sought to strengthen the weak African states
that were emerging from colonial subjugation. He wrote: 'Created only a few years after
independence it was normal that the continental organization should devote itself to the
objective of the Charter (Art. 2. I.e. of the Charter) of defending their sovereignty, their
territorial integrity and their independence. ,401
That may be so but isn't there a need for the OAU to keep pace with the evolution
of international law and the the changing times? There is no denying that the concepts of
non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of states are fundamental
concepts in the United Nations Charter and customary international law.402 However, while
"The said Article reads: "... the member states solemnly affirm and declare their
adherence to the following principles: 1 . The sovereign equality of all member states."
400
Michel-Cyrdjiena Wembu, The OAU and International Law in THE ORGANIZATION OF
African Unity After Thirty Years, 17 (Yassin El-Ayouty ed., 1994).
*° x
1d. at 16
^See U.N. Charter Art.2 (4) & 2 (7).
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the United Nations Security Council, especially after the end of the cold war, has interpreted
these concepts restrictively, and utilized its Chapter VII powers to deal internal situations
within member states, the OAU has dogmatically and conservatively continued to observe
these norms, allowing conflicts to rage on in Africa unabated.403 Some examples will
illustrate this contrast between the Universal body and the regional OAU.
In December 1992 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 794
authorizing the Secretary General in tandem with cooperating member states "to use all
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief
operations in Somalia."404 Clearly the Security Council was expansively interpreting its
Chapter VII powers to deal with an internal conflict within a member state in order to
"restore peace, stability, and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a
political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at national reconciliation
in Somalia."405 Although it failed to achieve its objective, the Somalia operation
unequivocally marked the beginning of an activist post-cold war Security Council
intervention in matters hitherto regarded as internal affairs of member states.406
The Security Council Resolution 940 on Haiti was even a further step away from the
concepts of absolute sovereignty of states and non-interference with internal affairs of
member states.407 Through this resolution, the Security Council authorized the intervention
of a multinational force in Haiti to restore ousted President Aristide and remove from power
^S.ICB. Asante, The Role of the OAU in Promoting Peace, Development and Regional
Security in Hansen supra note 124, at 127.
^S.C. Res. 794, UN. SCOR, 47th Sess., 314th mtg. at 63, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
«*Id.
4
K.uth Gordon, The United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia and
Beyond 15 MICH.J. INT'L L. 519, 545 (1994).
^S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. 3413th mtg. At 1-4, U.N. S/RES/940 (1994).
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the military junta that ousted him.408 Such is the elastic interpretation of Chapter VII that a
coup d'etat can be termed as "a threat to international peace" necessitating Security Council
enforcement action.409
While this evolution (or is revolution?) is going on within the United Nations, The
OAU has continued to stringently observe the norms of sovereign equality of member states
and non-interference with internal affairs of member states in a fashion clearly out of tune
with the present reality.410 Since all member states are equal sovereigns their territorial
integrity must be observed by all and sundry and this involves religiously observing the norm
of non-interference with internal affairs of member states and inviolability of state
boundaries. 411 Devastating conflicts and concomitant humanitarian crises have been raging
from the horn of Africa (Sudan and Somalia) to the heart of Africa (Rwanda, Burundi and
Zaire). Yet the OAU has continued to bury its head in the sand of outmoded international
law concepts.412
This state of affairs does not augur well for the future of the OAU. There is a need
for the OAU to reevaluate its role. If the OAU does not come up with a formula for dealing
with internal conflicts, unilateral intervention by member states will be new norm and slowly
«*ld.
^^Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention Through the United Nations: Towards
the Development of Criteria, 53 ZAORV (HEIDELBERG J. INTL.L.) 557, 564 (1993).
410
It may be recalled the reassertion of the principle of sovereignty even within the United
Nations during the first few decades after World War II was spearheaded by the members of the
OAU within the United Nations in tandem with other developing countries, through a series of
resolutions in the General Assembly. For a discussion of these resolutions see CHANGING PRIORITIES
of the International Agenda: The New International Economic Order (Karl P. Sauvan, ed.,
1971).
41
'William J. Foltz, The Organization ofAfrican Unity and the Resolution ofAfrican's
Conflicts in CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN Africa 352 (Francis Deng & William Zartman eds., 1991).
412
See Chapter I (B).
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but surely the OAU will be pushed to political limbo. Tanzania's intervention in Uganda in
1979 is a case in point.413 The intervention of ECOMOG in the Liberian Civil war, if
successful in restoring civil order and stability in Liberia, may mark the beginning of a shift
of the center of power from the continental body to sub-regional groups that have the will
and the means to act.414
2. Institutional and Structural Limitations
Apart from the normative weaknesses inherent in the OAU Charter, various
institutional and structural anomalies have continued to constrain the capacity of the OAU
to play an effective role in resolving regional conflicts. Chief among them is the delimitation
of competencies between its principal organs. The Charter creates four "principal
Institutions"; the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, The
Secretariat, and the commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.415 The Charter
further clothes these institutions with varying degrees of competencies.416
A closer scrutiny however reveals that the Assembly is the organ with real power;
the other organs are just ancillaries to the Assembly with no real powers of their own (save
for the Commission whose anomalies have been dealt with in detail elsewhere).417 The
Assembly is the "supreme organ" combining both executive and judicial powers in addition
to general supervisory power over the other organs.418 The Assembly may "review the
413TONY AVTRGAN, WAR IN UGANDA 53-95 (1982).
414
See Chapter IV (D)(1)
415OAU Charter Art. VTL
416OAU Charter Arts. VTH-XVUI.
417
See Chapter I (A) (1).
418OAU Charter Arts. VUL, EX, X & XXVH.
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structure, functions and acts of all the other organs and any specialized agencies."419 In
contrast the Council of Ministers is confined to preparing conferences for the Assembly,
implementing its decisions and taking "cognizance of any matter referred to it by the
Assembly."420 As for the Secretariat, the Charter does not confer any significant role for the
Secretary-General under whom the Secretariat is supposed to function.421
An examination of the history of OAU reveals that the founders were keen on
retaining all important competencies for the Assembly. So much so that the Secretary-
General was not intended to play any politically significant role.422 Hence the tittle
"Administrative Secretary-General."423 This asymmetry of power and monopolization of
initiative by the Assembly, has not worked very well for the OAU. Indeed, Boutros-Ghali's
prediction shortly after the OAU inaugural conference that drafted the Charter, remains true
today:
It would be presumptuous to pass judgement on the organization at this stage,
but one cannot help noticing that extremely broad powers have been bestowed
upon the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, when these powers
are considered in relation to those already enjoyed by each head of state in his
own country, it becomes obvious that the Assembly is the only real organ of
the OAU. . . the Council of Ministers has virtually no authority of its own. If
this is true of the second ranking organ of the OAU, it applies even more to
the other organs. . .there does seem to be a trend towards an "Africa of Heads
of State.424
419OAU Charter Art.VTA.
420OAU Charter Art. XHI.
421OAU Charter Art.XVI.
422James O. Jonah supra note 253, at 5.
423A resolution on the functions and regulations of the General Secretariat was adopted by
the Council of Ministers at Dakar on August 1 1 , 1963. Rule 11 of the regulations which list the
functions of the Secretary-General is just a summary of the strictly technical aspects of the duties of
the executive head of any organization without more. See Sohn supra note 16, at 93.
424BOUTROS-GHALI supra note 86, at 45.
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A comparison of the role of the OAU Secretary General and that of his United
Nations counterpart will reveal the minimalist notion of the role the drafters of the OAU
Charter intended the Secretary-General to play. Apart from the Administrative duties
endowed on the United Nations Secretary General by Article 97 of the United Nations
Charter, Article 98 confers on the Secretary-General the authority to make and submit annual
reports to the General-Assembly on the work of the United Nations, and more importantly
Article 99 empowers the Secretary General "to bring to the attention of the Security Council
any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and
security."
425
It is from this provision that the powers of the United Nations Secretary-General
to investigate situations that are likely to endanger peace and use his "good offices" to resolve
conflicts, emanate.426
Provisions similar to Article 98 and 99 of the United Nations Charter are missing in
the OAU Charter. So that over the years the OAU Secretary-General has shied away from
proactively using his good offices to resolve conflicts or take any similar diplomatic initiative
on his own motion lest it be interpreted as arrogating to himself a visible political role.427 The
result has been that small conflicts that could be resolved at the earliest convenience and at
minimum expense of time and resources have been left to escalate. It takes a Secretary
General of exceptional personal abilities (like the incumbent one) to overcome these legal
hurdles and play some role in dispute resolution.
425
U.N. Charter Art.98.
426
Jonah supra note 253, at 5.
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One might argue that sitting OAU Chairmen have been able to play this crucial role
and therefore it is not necessary to confer such powers on the Secretary-General.428 It is true
that sitting OAU Chairmen have, in practice, played this role traditionally meant for the
Secretary-General (in effect eclipsing the Secretary General) although the Charter does not
envision such a role for the occupants of this office.429 It is acceptable to the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government that the Chairman plays such a role since himself being a
head of state at par with his peers in the Assembly is in retrospect the Assembly exercising
that power. In any case, that way the danger of a powerful Secretary General emerging does
not arise. However the problem is that the Chairman is too busy with his state responsibilities
to find sufficient time to personally play an effective and meaningful role in conflict resolution.
This is the ideal role for the Secretary General.
Closely allied with the problem of 'Africa of Heads of State' is another lacuna within
the OAU "constitutional order,"- lack of an enforcement organ akin to the United Nations
Security Council.430 There is need for creating such an organ bestowed with the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of regional peace and security. The Assembly of Heads of
State and government, like the United Nations General Assembly, is too large and with
diverse opinions to be able to make timely decisions of such magnitude and implement them
with the necessary speed. In any case even the Assembly of Heads of state and Government
is not bestowed with disciplinary or enforcement powers. 431
429
Rule 10 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
describes the role of the chairman as that of chairing and directing meetings, and ensuring order and
decorum of the proceedings of the Assembly. The diplomatic role played by the Chairman in
resolving conflict is a creature of practice that has no basis in the OAU juridical order. See Sohn
supra note 16, at 79.
430
U. N. Charter Chapter V & VH.
S.K.B. Asante, The Role of the Organization ofAfrican Unity in Promoting Peace,
Development and Regional Security in AFRICA IN AFRICA PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND
DEVELOPMENT 128 (Emanuel Hansen, 1987).
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Another anomaly in the OAU Charter is linked with the procedural aspect of the
decision-making process within the OAU. For a meeting of either the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government or the Council of Ministers to take place, two-thirds of the members
must be present to form the requisite quorum and further more, any decision of the Assembly
is determined by two-third of the total membership of the organization.432 This is a very
significant threshold and many a time the running and proffer functioning of the organization
may be jeopardized by lack of quorum. This leads credence to the accusation that the Charter
has an inbuilt tendency to encourage indecisiveness and ineffectiveness.433
Closely connected to this is the general over-reliance on consensus and informal
structures in decision-making and dispute resolution, respectively. Consensus and diplomatic
resolution of disputes is important, but there are limits. Some conflicts are susceptible to
diplomatic solutions while others are only amenable to juridical resolution.434 The OAU's
over-reliance on diplomacy and ad hoc procedures has left many disputes temporarily
resolved only to resurface later in greater magnitude because diplomatic solutions rarely go
to the bottom and substance of a dispute.435 Dealing with the substance by going to the core
of a dispute is the raison d'etre of juridical processes. There is therefore a glaring need for
the creation of a judicial organ within the OAU legal regimes alternative or supplemental to
diplomatic means.
432
See rules 14 & 25 of The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, and Rule 18 of The Rules of Procedure of the Council of Foreign Ministers, reproduced
in Sohn supra note 16, at 77-97 (1971).
433
Folts supra note 275, at 350.
434
Id at 356.
435
For example the Ethiopia/Somalia border conflict was superficially solved by the OAF
only to resurface later in a greater magnitude. See Chapter I (B) (1) a.
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B. Non-Charter Based Obstacles
Many other factors external to the mechanics of the OAU have contributed in
curtailing the effectiveness of the OAU. Whereas it is not within the province of this thesis
to examine them in detail, it is worth the while to mention some of them in passing. The
dominant one is the general lack of financial resources. More than any other regional
organization, the OAU, ever since its formation, has continued to experience debilitating
budgetary problems.436 Nevertheless it is not possible to divorce an organization from the
socio-economic environment within which it functions. The financial ill-health of the OAU
is neatly intertwined with the economic condition of the African states which form its
membership. The financial position of the OAU is therefore expected to improve with the
improvement in the economic situation in Africa.
Political inertia also continue to bog down the organization.437 Hence the need to
inject some life into the OAU by redrafting its Charter so that the organization can be given
a new lease of life. Closely related with the problem of political inertia is what has been
referred to as a legitimacy crisis within the OAU. Due to general lack of effectiveness in
enforcing its will and its general aloofness in the face of internal conflicts many member states
have dared to take independent positions on conflicts without attracting any sanctions from
the OAU.438
In sum the OAU Charter is replete with structural and normative anomalies rendering
the OAU a very weak tool for regional conflict resolution. There is therefore an urgent need
436
Asante supra note 349, at 128.
437See Foltz supra note 275, at 350.
438
For example some member states recognized Biafra without any protest from the OAU.
Others do not pay their dues and the OAU cannot do anything. Some states like Malawi and Zambia
were militarily and economically vulnerable to support OAU's resolutions on Southern Rhodesia
while others for unknown reasons simply defied the OAU. For a discussion of these and other factors
that show the erosion of legitimacy and authority of the OAU see Scott et aal supra note 243.
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to overhaul the Charter to strengthen its institutional and normative structure, and rid it of
archaic international law concepts that have no place in today's increasingly interdependent
world. In particular an effective executive organ that can respond to the conflict resolution
and management needs of a highly volatile region need to be created and the office of the
Secretary-General to be empowered. A judicial organ buttressed with compulsory jurisdiction
over inter-state disputes is also a prerequisite. Anachronistic norms such as non-interference
with internal affairs ofmember states and inviolability of state frontiers must be discarded or
reinterpreted to cope with the conflict resolution needs of our time.
CHAPTER IV
OTHER MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA
The problem of conflict resolution in Africa cannot be divorced from the larger
question of regional security. Is there a regional security problem in Africa? Of course the
current instability and protracted conflicts in Africa pose a regional security problem. But is
there a regional security problem (real or potential) posed by an external force? This chapter
answers these questions and also examines sub-regional mechanisms for resolution of
localized conflicts in Africa. In particular part A and B of this chapter examine the proposals
to create a regional defense mechanism and regional intervention force and the legal problems
such initiatives might encounter. Part C examines sub-regional conflict resolution mechanisms
and their place in the OAU conflict resolution structure.
A. Regional Self-defense Mechanism
A common defense system for Africa is not a new idea. At the creation of the OAU
the formation of an African defense force, an "African High Command", as the late Kwame
Nkrumah liked to call it, was thought of as a neccessary arm of the proposed African union
gorvernment.439 The plan was to create a mechanism for collective action against the
remaining colonial regimes and any external aggressor.440 The Assembly of Heads of State and
Government debated the idea and eventually incorporated it into the Charter, albeit in a
439
Agbi supra note 1 1 8, at 1 15.
WW.
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whittled-down form of a Defense Commission.441 Since the commission did not have military
capability to back its resolutions, it was a non-starter ab initio.**2
If the OAU wishes to resurrect this idea of a common defense mechanism it may
borrow a leaf from the Western European and Northern Atlantic states by starting a military
self-defense arrangement permitted by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.443 This could
be done by amending the present OAU Charter to incorporate provisions similar to Article
5 of the NATO treaty to the effect that if one of the OAU member states is attacked the
attack will be viewed as an attack on all of them and therefore the members of the alliance
"individually and in concert with other parties" will forthwith take "such action as it deems
neccessary"in self-defense 444
That a pan-African defense force made a lot of sense in the framework of a continental
government and in the face of threats of invasion by the then existing colonial regimes is
beyond doubt. Now that there are no colonial regimes left in Africa to threaten the
independent existence of African states, is a colllective self-defense arrangement neccessary?
The North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO) was created to quarantee the security of
post-war Europe against possible attacks from expansionist post-war Russia and any possible
threat from Germany.445 Scholars are now questioning the need for NATO after the threat of
"•The OAU Charter Article XX (4).
**2For instance in 1969, Portugal carried out military attacks on Guinea and Senegal in
retaliation for the support the two countries were offering to African nationalist groups within
Portuguese African territories. The Defense Commission did nothing. Agbi supra note 1 18, at 122.
443
Unite Nations Charter Article 51 provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individuals or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member
of the United nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security"
^North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 4 Bevans 829, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34
U.N.T.S. 243.
*"ld. at 480.
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an attack from the Warsaw Pact evaporated with the collapse of communism in eastern
Europe.446
One cannot, even more, see the need for such an alliance in Africa where a serious
threat from an external enemy has never existed. The viability of such an alliance given its
financial implications contrasted with the economic conditions in Africa, is questionable.
Further more African security problems are basically internal. Although conflicts in Africa are
usually supported by external forces, there is no identifiable direct military threat against
African States' teritorrial independence that calls for a collective self-defense military pact.
Howerver if created within the existing OAU framework without an elaborate institutional
structure and avoiding unnecessary financial expense a pan-African military alliance may act
as a deterrence to external forces, real or imaginary, that may be (in future) bent on
formenting trouble in Africa.
B. Regional Intervention Force
A security architecture for Africa must of neccessity include a regional intervention
force as one of its key pillars. As already observed, the idea of a continental pan-African
military force is not a new one. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, at the inception of the OAU proposed
what he called an 'African High Command' as the military wing of his envisioned African
continental government.447 Although Nkrumah 's envisioned force was intended to ward off
external aggression, nothing today stands in the way of creating a force with the twin
objectives of fighting external enemies and intervening to resolve internal conflicts.
In spite of the fact that, at its inception, the OAU shelved the idea of an intervention
force in favor of a commission, the need for such a force has refused to go way. Never has
Jane E. Stromseth, The North Atlantic Treaty and the European Security After the Cold
War, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J.479, 479 (1991).
44 Obed Asamoah, Nkrumah' s Foreign Policy in THE LlEE AND WORK OFKWAME
Nkrumah 195-6 (Kwameh Arhin ed., 1993).
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this need been demonstrated in the most brutal way than in the last eight years. The Horn of
Africa and the Great Lakes region has been embroiled in devastating conflicts that have
claimed millions of lives, displaced millions, torn communities and states apart, with a rapidity
and vengeance unwitnessed before. Such a force, had it existed, could have mitigated if not
stemmed the tide of these inexplicable conflicts.
The OAU and the international community have been forced to own up to the need
of such a force. In October 1996 former United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher
made a week-long tour of Africa to solicit support for what he termed an "African crisis
response force," that would be trained and equipped by the United States.448 The OAU seems
to be seriously considering the creation of such a force, but there are fundamental differences
between the United States proposal and the OAU plan.449 While the Washington-proposed
force would be under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, the OAU intends
to create a force under its own comand and control. It is logical that the OAU being a
continental body should seek to create a regional force under its armpit. But why Washington
feels it would be necessary to depart from the normal legal practice of deploying a
multinational force of a universal character in any conflict that threatened international peace,
under the direction of the Security Council, and instead create an African force under the
command of the Universal Security Council
_
to be deployed in African conflicts
_
is at best
bizarre.450
Besides the practical problem of designing an acceptable structure for such a force
there are other problem that stand in the way of the creation of the envisaged force. Firstly,
Panafrican news Agency,
htttp://www.africanews.org/usal/usafrica.iisafrica.8003985999.html.
449W
450See Online Focus, News Maker: Warren Christopher, Http://web-
erOl .pbs.org/newshour/bb...st/october 96/christopher_10-15html.
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there is the problem of the OAU Charter whose letter and spirit does not have room for such
a force.
451 The OAU was created as bulwork against colonialism and a safeguard for the
sovereignty of member states. It was never intended to play a supranational role. Yet the
creation of a regional intervention force entails a supranational role for the OAU necessarilly
anti-thetical to the protection of sovereignty of the member states. An antidote to this state
of affairs is an overhaul of the entire OAU Charter as a prerequisite to the creation of the
proposed force. Whether the OAU member state have the political will so to do is a different
matter.
A second obstacle to the creation of such a force, more problematic and intricate,
relate to the validity of such a force in international law. If the force is to be a peace keeping
one, acting within the tenets of traditional peacekeeping
_
to be deployed with the consent
of the belligerent parties either to observe a pre-agreed ceasefire or monitor the
implementation of a peace settlement, without interfering with the so-called "internal affairs"
of a state
_
there are no legal problems to bloc the formation of such a force by the OAU
or any other regional or sub-regional body.452 The problem arises when the force is intended
to engage in what is termed as humanitarian intervention (precisely the purpose envisioned
for the force by the present writer)
_
a grey area of international law whose frontiers are not
clearly delimited.
453
451
It has been argued before that the central norm in the OAU Charter is non-interference in
the internal affairs of member states. Hence an intervention force is not envisaged in the OAU
constitutional order.
452
This is the role that a traditional peacekeeping force does. Chapter VHI of the United
Nations Charter permits regional organizations to engage in peacekeeping activities, among their
other mandates in the maintenance of regional peace and security.
See Generally Rosalin Higgins, Intervention and International Law in INTERVENTION IN
WORLD POLITICS 29-44 ( Hedley Bull ed., 1984)
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Opinion of scholars is divided over whether humanitarian intervention is prohibited
or permitted in international law.454 The heart of the controversy is Article 2 (4) of the United
Nations Charter which reads:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.455
Basically, two schools have evolved over the interpretation of the above provision.456
For the positivists, Article 2 (4) prohibits all forms of use of force in relations between states
except in self-defense as per Article 51 or for peace enforcement purpose by the Security
Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Use of force in any other manner
runs afoul of Article 2(4).
457
This interpretation is predicated upon classical positivist theory
of international law according to which states are the primary subjects of international law.458
Human beings have no place in this perception of international law since their interests are an
amalgamation of the individual states to which they belong. The principle of non-intervention
is ancillary to the right of sovereignty in that it is intended to guarantee independent states'
liberty to conduct their own affairs unimpaired by external interference.459
454
See generally Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (1973); F. X.
De Lima, Intervention in International law, (University of Virginia Press, 1 97 1 ).
455
U. N. Charter Art. 2(4).
456
This is an oversimplification. Scholars have identified a myriad of schools ranging from
realists and liberals to the cosmopolitans. See Ravi Mahalingam, The Compatibility of the Principle
of Non-intervention with the Right ofHumanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 221, 222-237 (1996).
457See Articles by Ian Brownlie and Richard B. Lillich in Law AND CrviL WAR IN MODERN
World (John Norton Moore ed., 1974). Both scholars profound diametrically opposed view points
as to the legality of use of force with Brownlie arguing it is illegal while Lillich argues use of force is
supported by state practice and customary law generally.
45
*Id. at 222.
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On the other hand the cosmopolitans adopt a permissive interpretation of Article 2 (4).
They Argue that humanitarian intervention is a customary law right that survived the United
Nations Charter although in a modified form.460 The positivists counter this by arguing that
even though customary law allowed humanitarian intervention prior to the enactment of the
United Nation's Charter, use of force for humanitarian purposes was outlawed in 1945 by the
incorporation of Article 2 (4) in the United Nations Charter.
461
A number of reasons explain why scholars cannot agree on the scope of prohibition
on the use of force in the United Nations Charter. First, the wording of Article 2(4) is
ambiguous; hence capable of varied interpretation. What does the terms "territorial integrity"
and "political independence" mean? Does the prohibition of use of force against territorial
integrity only outlaw annexation of a state's territory by another or does it also extend to any
violation of the frontiers of a state for any other purpose such as rescuing aliens trapped in
a civil war or rescuing hostages taken by some religious fanatics? Does prohibition on the use
of force against the political independence of a state mean an action intended to annex another
state so that it ceases to exist as an independent state? Does it also include any coercive action
against such a state intended to make it follow a particular policy? And what is use of force?
Must it be a military action? Is a threat to cut military aid to a developing country unless it
adopts certain human rights standards or hold democratic elections amount to use of force
against political independence of such a state? Clearly some of the scenarios outlined above
do not amout to use of force envisioned by Article 2(4). However, the problem lies in
demarcating the line between what actions amount to and what actions do not amount to use
of force in contravention of Article 2(4).
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Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and A Pleafor
Constructive Alternatives in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN MODERN WORLD 231-244 (Jom Norton Moore
ed., 1974).
^'ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention in Id. at 218- 228.
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Secondly, state practice has not been consistent and that has not helped in clarifying
what the drafters of Article 2(4) meant. While states have over the years used force for
humanitarian purposes against other states, and have justified their actions on humanitarian
grounds, more often than not, they have adduced other grounds like self-defense and consent
of the legitimate authorities of the states in which they are intervening. 462And since some of
the grounds like consent and self-defense are valid in international law, it is difficulty to isolate
situations where states intervened for purely humanitarian considerations so as to be able to
decide whether such intervention was legitimate or not.463
Thirdly, scholars have been 'pro-intervention' or 'anti-intervention' depending on
their theortical and philosophical perception of international law. Professors Henkin and
Teson, perhaps the sharpest contemporary proponents of non-intervention and the right of
humanitarian intervention, respectively, best illustrate this point. Prof. Henkin is an absolute
believer in the prohibition of use of force.464 He contends that save for the two exceptions to
the non-use of force in the United Nations Charter, all other forms of use of force are
outlawed by Article 2(4). His conclusion is based on his perception of the historical mission
of the United Nations and the normative structure of its Charter.465 For Henkin the values
built into the United Nations Charter form a normative hierarchy. Peace is at the apex of this
hierarchy, other norms like respect for human rights, economic and social development, the
right of self-determination and justice are of lesser importance:
^See studies of state practice in ANTONIO Tonga. FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN
Internal Conflicts 148-195 (1995).
^Tanzania justified its invasion of Uganda on both the grounds of self-defense and
humanitarian purposes. T.V. Sathyamarthy, THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF UGANDA: 1900-
1986 608-57 (1986); The United states too put forward many grounds for its invasion of Grenada.
See generally John Norton Moore. Law and the Grenada Mission (1984); Scott Davidson
Grenada, A Study in Politics and the Limits of International Law (1987).
464
Louis Henkin, the Use ofForce: Law and US. Policy in RIGHT V. MIGHT 37-69 (John
Temple Swing ed.. 1991).
"*Id. at 38.
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The Charter reflected universal agreement that the status quo prevailing at the
end of the World War II was not to be changed by force. Even justified
grievances and sincere concern for "national security" or other "vital interest"
would not warrant any nation's initiating war. Peace was the paramount value.
The Charter and the organization were dedicated to realizing other values as
well
_
self-determination, respect for human rights, economic and social
development, justice, and a just international order. But those purposes could
not justify the use of force to achieve them; they would have to be pursued by
other means. Peace was more important than progress and more important
than justice.466
Prof. Teson on the other hand, argues that individuals and not states should be the
primary subjects of international law.467 For Teson, promotion of human rights is the highest
value in the United Nation's normative structure. He sees the World War II as a war in
defense of human rights.468 In the view of Teson there is no other way the legitimacy of states
can be justified other than the protection and enforcement of human rights. He writes:
The human rights imperative underlies the concepts of state and government
and the precepts that are to protect them, most prominently Article 2(4). The
rights of states recognized by international law are meaningful only on the
assumption that those states minimally observe individual rights. The United
Nations purpose of promoting and protecting human rights found in Article
1(3), and by reference in Article 2(4) as a qualifying clause to the prohibition
of war, has a necessary primacy over the respect for state sovereignty. Force
used in defense of fundamental human rights is therefore not a use of force
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.469
Further digression into this controversy is unwarranted. However several points need
to be made. Whatever some opponents of humanitarian intervention might say, there is
«*Id.
"^Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and
Morality 81 (1988).
"*Id. at 135.
469
Id. at 153.
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general consensus among scholars that certain forms of humanitarian intervention are
permitted by international customary law and the United Nations Charter. Some forms of
intervention have been characterized as "just," and hence acceptable because they are "based
on goals that have received general international approval, such as anti-colonialism self-
determination, and the implementation of human rights."470 Even Prof. Henkin admits that
humanitarian intervention "strictly limited to what is necessary to save lives," "has brought
wide acquiescence."471 Mention has already been made of intervention by a state into another
state either by consent or invitation by the 'legitimate authorities' of that state; a practice
accepted by customary international law.
After the end of the Cold War the bubble of non-intervention seems to have bursted.
Certain forms of intervention hitherto prohibited seems to have gained currency and
acceptability as legitimate forms of intervention. Intervention in support of democracy
restricted to restoring a validly elected government to power, after a military coup is now
supported by both state practice and opinion of publicist. However it is accepted only to the
extent that it is carried out in a collective fashion within the auspices of the United Nations
Security Council or a regional organization, as one commentator observes: ". . . the right of
collective intervention may well have crystallized in recent state practice, as recent scholarship
focusing on the crucial distinction between collective and unilateral intervention seems to
suggest."
472 United Nations intervention in the civil war in Somalia to protect relief agencies
470
Gabriel Wilner, Introduction to panel 1, 13 GEORGIA J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 189, 190
(1982).
He even concedes that this intervention is not restricted to actions by a state on behalf of
its own nationals. Henkin supra note 463, at 41
.
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Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: the Reconstruction ofArticle 2(7) and the
Rise ofFederalism under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEX. INT'LL.J. 353,365 (1996).
105
from the warring factions is the earliest example of this post-cold war intervention.43 The
Security-Council-authorized intervention to restore the democratically elected government
of president Aristide to power after a military junta took power in Haiti has been seen as
classic example of intervention to protect democracy.4 ' 4 The latest intervention for democracy
is the OAU-authorized intervention in Sierra Leone by the forces of the Economic
Community of West Africa States (ECOMOG) to reverse a coup by a military junta that
overthrow the elected government of president Kabbah.475
In conclusion there is no evidence in the present status of international law barring the
OAU from creating the proposed intervention force. Such a force once created will serve as
a very useful instrument for resolution of conflicts that threaten regional peace. The OAU
however must exercise caution in deploying such a force; the force should not be deployed
at the slightest excuse. Deployment must be done strictly within the limits of humanitarian
intervention,
476
lest the force becomes a hegemonic tool in the hands of powerful regional
states.
477
473See U.N. Security Council Res. 792 supra note 404.
474See U. N. Security Council Res. 940 supra note 407.
475
See subsection C (3) below.
476A number of conditions against which to judge an intervention to determine whether it
qualifies to be a humanitarian intervention have been suggested by scholars. They include (1) human
rights violations must be egregious; (2) all peaceful means for resolving the conflict must be
exhausted; (3) there must be no immediate hope of relief in the absence of intervention; (4) the
intervention must be aimed at stopping the violation of human rights; (5) the principle of
proportionality must be respected; the victims of human rights violations must welcome the
intervention; and (6) collective intervention is to be preferred to unilateral actions. These criteria
have generally gained acceptance, but the specific meaning of each criterion and factual situations
that satisfy them is still a subject of debate. See Teson supra, note 466, at 1 1 1-123; Athony
Chukwukaa Ofodile, The Legality ofEcowas Intervention in Liberia, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSAT'L L.
381,396(1994).
'
'Nigerian dominance of the ECOWAS peace initiative in Liberia was reported to have
been the main obstacle to negotiation and cease-fire between the warring parties. Id. at 385.
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C. Utilization of Sub-regional Mechanisms
A number of factors make utilization of sub-regional mechanisms to resolve sub-
regional conflicts very convenient and politically attractive to the OAU. Given the OAU
budgetary constrains, sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),478
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC),479 and Economic Community of Central
African State (ECCAS)480 being economic groupings, have the financial wherewithal lacking
in the OAU to finance a conflict resolution initiative. Utilization of sub-regional mechanisms
also enables the OAU to avoid the possibility of alienating some states that may not agree
with its decision. This way the OAU is able to sustain the cohesiveness within its ranks that
it seems to covet so much, without having to let conflicts continue devastating the continent.
The destabilizing effect that an internal conflict seems to cause at the sub-regional
level makes the neighboring states that have a stake in the resolution of the conflict ready and
willing to invest in its resolution.
48
'The proximity of the sub-regional states to the conflict
locale and their knowledge of the intricacies of the conflict makes them more effective in
planning and implementing an intervention initiative. Perhaps this explains the relative success
with which sub-regional organizations have undertake conflict resolution initiatives.
Examination ofECOWAS intervention in Liberia, sanctions on Burundi by neighboring states
47833I.L.M. 1067(1994).
47932 I.L.M. 267 (1993).
"^ I.L.M. 945 (1984).
48
'it is on record that support for the ECOWAS initiative was at first lukewarm but when the
warring parties started destabilizing neighboring countries, ECOWAS received unqualified support.
For instance, Taylor's NPFL "precipitated a revolt in Sierra Leone, which lead to the fall of president
Joseph Momoh." Immediately several countries joined the ECOWAS initiative to forestall similar
revolts within their borders. Ofodile infra note at 384.
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to protest the overthrowal of a democratically elected government, and the recent OAU
authorization of ECOWAS to intervene in Sierra Leone will throw more light on this
discussion.
1. ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia
Liberia is one of the countries that one may term a failed state. 482 Devastated by a civil
war since 1989 pitting Charles Taylor's National patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Prince
Johnson's Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), a break-away faction
from NPFL, and United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO), a remnant of Samuel
Doe's army, and other factions,483 an estimated 200,000 people have been killed and half of
the countries 2.8 million people have been rendered homeless. Civic life and institutions have
completely broken down. 484
The germs of the Liberian conflict originated from the history of this country. The
Republic of Liberia was founded in 1847 by former American slaves.485 They settled in what
is now Monrovia and set up a system of government that excluded the indigenous tribes and
treated them as second-class citizens. This precipitated a chasm that has never healed to this
day. 486 The Americo-Liberians ruled the Country until 1980 when Samuel K. Doe a native
Liberian of the minority Krahn tribe overthrow and killed the American-descended president.
482
For a discussion of the salient features of a failed state see Henry J. Richardson, m,
"Failed State," Self-determination, and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and
Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'LL.J. 1 (1996).
483
Anthony Chukwukaa Ofodile, The Ligality ofEOWAS Intervention in Liberia, 32
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 38 1 , 383-89 ( 1 994).
Netscape: CNN Interactive,
http://www.am.c»nVWORlJ)/9604/30/hberia/background.html.
™ld.
^Ofodile supra note 476, at 288.
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William Tolbert.487 Doe imposed martial law and ruled with an iron fist until 1985 when a new
constitution restored civilian rule. In January 1986 the new constitution took effect but Doe
retained power by rigging the elections.488
Civil war started in 1989 when Charles Taylor, who had returned to Liberia after
bribing his way out of a Massachusetts prison in the United States, invaded the country with
his rebels from the neighboring Ivory Coast. In the ensuing war, Taylor's forces managed to
occupy most of the country except Monrovia.489 Taylor's take-over of the whole country was
checked when Prince Johnston (one of his commanders) broke away to form his own faction.
Johnston entered into a pact with Doe and started (in tandem with Doe's forces) to drive back
Taylor's rebels from the outskirts of Monrovia. 490 In September 1990 Doe was brutally
murdered by forces loyal to Prince Johnson. Doe's forces regrouped under the name ULIMO
and the Civil war intensified with the three factions fighting against each other. 491
Shortly before the killing of Doe, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) decided to intervene in order to impose a cease-fire and end the war. The forces
of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), were
deployed in Liberia on August 27, 1990. Doe, who was then trapped in the presidential
bunker and Johnson supported the Intervention while Taylor declared war on ECOMOG, and
severally clashed with them.492 Several stages can be identified in the ongoing peace process
in Liberia.
487
Jennifer L.Tumer. Liberian Refugees: A Test of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing
Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa. 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 281, 287 (1994).
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a. The Initial Stages of ECOWAS Intervention
This stage is marked by three initiatives by ECOWAS: (1) deployment of forces to
enforce and monitor a cease-fire between the warring factions; (2) attempts to bring the
factions together to hammer out a peace formula; and (3) setting up of an interim
government. ECOWAS relied on Article 7 of its treaty and its Protocol on Non-aggression
to intervene in the war. Article 7 of ECOWAS treaty invests the Authority of Heads of State
and Government (AHSG), the "supreme institution of the community," with broad
supervisory powers and mandate to oversee the implementation of the objectives of the
Community.493 Although the Protocol On Non-aggression applies only to inter-state conflicts
the AHSG interpreted it broadly to encompass the Liberian conflict in view of the
destabilizing effect the conflict had regionally.494 Consequently, the AHSG established a
Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) comprising of two members appointed by the AHSG
and the Chairman of AHSG.495
ECOWAS ordered the ceasing of all military and para-military activities and surrender
of all arms and ammunition to ECOMOG.496 The warring factions were further ordered to
cooperate with SMC and ECOMOG so that law and order could be restored and cease-fire
maintained. EMOMOG was mandated with the role of assisting the SMC in supervising the
implementation of the Cease-fire.497
493
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Revised Treaty, Done at
Cotonou. Benin, July 24. 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660 (1996).
494
See Protocol on Non-Aggression. Apr. 22, 1978, reprinted in Economic Community of
West African States: policies and Programme Series 21-22 (1981) referred in Kufuor infra note 494,
at 375.
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The next step was for ECOWAS to establish an interim government that would
oversee the countries transition to democracy. A conference of all the Liberian political
parties, patriotic fronts, interest groups and concerned citizens was organized in Abuja
(Nigeria).498 The conference drafted a peace plan and established a broad-based Interim
Government of National Unity (IGNU) Headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer as the President. The
conference also established a 51 member broad-based legislative Assembly. The OAU
endorsed its support for the Interim Government, the Peace Plan and the efforts of ECOWAS
to bring peace in Liberia.499
The peace plan however was doomed to fail ab initio. Charles Taylor's NPFL, whose
forces controlled more than half of the country refused to participate in the Interim
Government. Despite efforts by ECOWAS to assuage Taylor's fears, his forces continued
to engage ECOMOG in battle.500 For instance, ECOMOG incorporated troops from Senegal
and other French-speaking countries (that had initially supported Taylor) to offset the
dominance of Nigerian forces that Taylor accused of partiality. Taylor however insisted on
being made the interim president and allowed to run for the presidency during the elections;
although all the parties had agreed that the interim president should not be eligible for the
presidential elections. 501
Several fruitless meetings were organized by the SMC between NPFL and IGNU to
try to win the confidence of NPFL. The first meeting (held in 1991) involved neutral
observers from International Negotiations Network (INN) and states considered sympathetic
™Id.
499
Turner supra note 487, at 289.
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to NPFL. 502 The second meeting was organized in Yamoussoukro (Cote d'lvoire). Here
NPFL and IGNU agreed to establish a five member Elections Commission to organize and
supervise elections, and an ad hoc Supreme Court to settle disputes that may arise from the
elections.
503 The third meeting of the committee produced the so-called Yamoussoukro IV
Accord, incorporating the decisions of the second meeting and the agreement between NPFL
and IGNU. 504 The NPFL however continued to renege on the peace process. 503 The NPFL
refused to implement the Yamoussoukro Accord IV and launched an attack on ECOMOG"s
positions in Monrovia. Although ECOMOG repelled the attack it was clear that the peace
process was derailed. 506
b. United Nation's Involvement
The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 788 in which it affirmed its
belief that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord "offers the best possible framework for a peaceful
resolution of the Liberian conflict."
50. The resolution further directed all states to implement
a general arms embargo against Liberia (except for arms and equipment destined for
ECOMOG) and supported ECOWAS efforts to bring peace in Liberia. The Security Council
called upon the parties to abide by the Yamoussoukro IV Accord and directed the United
Nations Secretary-General to make a report on the implementation of Resolution 788. 508
^Kufuor supra note 495, at 379.
503Tumer supra note 487. at 289.
505
Kufuor supra note 495, at 381
.
^U.N. SCOR. 313th mtg, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (1992).
^U.N. SCOR. 3138th mtg, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (1992).
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The report submitted later to the Security Council, identified the main obstacles to the
peace process and the views of the parties involved in the conflict.509 On the basis of this
report, the Security Council passed Resolution 813 in which it reiterated its commitment to
the Liberian peace process and welcomed the continued commitment of ECOMOG to the
peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict. The resolution also hailed the support and
endorsement the OAU had given to the ECOWAS peace initiative. 510 The resolution also
acknowledged and acceded to the desire of the warring parties for a greater United Nations
involvement in the peace process. 511
c The Cotonou Peace Accord and the Akosombo Agreement
The United Nations Secretary General as mandated by the Security Council in
Resolution 813 (in conjunction with the OAU) assembled the parties to a peace conference
in Geneva. 512 The Cotonou Peace Accord signed by IGNU, ULIMO and NPFL on July 25,
1993 was an embodiment of the proceedings of the Geneva peace conference. 513 The Cotonou
Peace Accord invested the United Nations observer Mission and ECOWAS with a joint
responsibility to oversee the implementation of the peace process. The Accord further set-up
a five member Council of State to exercise executive power in the transitional period. 514
^Cited in U.N. SCOR. 8 1 3, 3 1 87th mtg, at 1 . U.N Doc. S/RES/8 1 3 ( 1 993).
510
Sec. U.N. SCOR. 26th mtg. at 1, UN Doc. S/RES/8 13 (1993).
511/J.at3.
512See Ofodile supra note 476, at 386.
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The Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 856 which underlined the
importance of the Cotonou Accord in ending the Liberian war and approved an advance team
of United Nations military observers. 515 By Resolution 866 the Security Council established
the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOIL) to work with ECOWAS in
monitoring the implementation of the peace Accord. 516
Owing to renewed fighting and emergence of more splinter groups from the three
main factions, another agreement amending the Cotonou Peace Accord was signed in
Akosombo (Ghana) on September 12, 1994. 517 Under this agreement ECOWAS agreed to
transfer much of its responsibilities to the transitional government which would henceforth
join ECOWAS and UNOMIL in the supervision and monitoring of the peace process. 518
Although sporadic fighting was reported between Taylor and Johnson in April last year the
peace monitoring groups seems to have contained the situation and Liberia seems to be on
an irreversible road to peace, as the peaceful outcome of the recently concluded elections
show. 519
A number of observations need to be made in conclusion. Although the United
Nations Observer Mission is involved, the Liberian peace process is clearly an ECOWAS
-
driven initiative. Indeed the Security Council, in Resolution 866 observed that the Liberian
Initiative was "the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in
cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization," but
stressed that ECOMOG had "the primary responsibility of supervising the implementation"
515
U.N. SCOR., 3262rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/856 (1993)
516See U.N. SCOR. 3281st mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (1993).
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Kufuor supra note 495, at 390.
518
See U.N. SCOR.3624th mtg, at 2 U.N.Doc. S/RES/1041 (1996).
519CNN Interactive: htto://www.cnn.comAVORLD/9604/30/liberia/background.html.
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of the Agreements.520 The involvement of the United Nations and the support of the OAU
was necessary to give the intervention credibility and legitimacy. 521 Indeed, the intervention
had been criticized as infringing on Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. The Security
Council Resolution 788 was therefore a kind of post ipso facto authorization of the
intervention.
Further more, the ECOWAS intervention is significant in a number of ways. It is the
first bold initiative by a sub-regional organization to intervene in a local conflict. Contrasted
with the ill-fated United Nations intervention in Somalia, the ECOWAS intervention in
Liberia is a big success. It has been able to stem the humanitarian crisis triggered by the war,
restored civil order, and a peace process that may lay the foundation for sustainable peace in
the country is on course. This Leads credence to an observation quickly gaining currency that
with the end of the cold war the primary responsibility of resolving conflicts is shifting to
regional and sub-regional bodies.
2. Sub-regional Sanctions on Burundi
Following a military coup in Burundi by Major Pierre Buyoya On July 25, 1996522 that
overthrew the legal government of Sylivestre Ntibantunganya, countries in the Great lakes
region decided to impose sanctions on the minority Tutsi regime that took over the reigns of
power. 523 Ntibantunganya had taken over the presidency after the death of Melchior
Ndandaye's successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira in a suspicious plane crash over Kigali with the
520
Sec. U.N. SCOR.3281st mtg, at 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 866 (1993).
521
See UN. SCOR.3187th mtg, at 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/813 (1993) in which the security
Council commends ECOWAS for its efforts to bring peace in Liberia and the OAU for endorsing
ECOWAS 's Initiatives.
Pan-African news Agency, Netscape: http://egi.bin.nando.net/plweb.egi/fastwe.
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then Rwandese president Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994.524 The coup was a
culmination of a bloody conflict that was sparked off by the assassination of the first
democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndandaye, in a putsch by the Tutsi military
on October 21, 1993. 525
An estimated 150,000 people were killed between October 1993 and the date of
Buyoya coup.526 The ensuing conflict pitted the extremist Hutu _ who saw the assassination
of Ndandaye as an attempt to sabotage the democratic revolution and revert to Tutsi
domination
_
against the Tutsi army and militia groups.527
Other than the sub-regional sanctions both the United Nations and the OAU have
responded to the crisis. The OAU condemned the coup and supported the sanctions imposed
by the states in the great lakes region. 528 It called upon the military junta to start dialogue with
other parties with a view to ending the conflict and reverting to democratic rule. In addition,
the OAU sent an observer mission to observe the peace process.529 The United Nations
Security Council in Resolution 1012 set up an international commission of inquiry to
investigate the facts leading to the assassination of President Ndandaye, the subsequent
massacres, and to recommend "measures with regard to the bringing to justice of persons
524
Africa News Online, http://www.amcanews.org/east/burundi/19970523_featl.html.
525
For a superb account of the history of Hutu-Tulsi conflict see Gerard Prunier-Writenet,
Burundi: Descent to Chaos or a Management Crisis?, (1995):
http://www.unhCT.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wribdi01.htm; and for some background information
about the Hutu and Tulsi see Neil Weiner, Hutu an Tulsi ofRwanda and Burundu:
http://www.backgroundbriefmg.com/hutututs.html.
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527Burundu Breaking the Cycle of Violence infra note.
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See Sec. Council Res. 1040, 3623rd mtg, on 29th January 1996, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1040
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responsible for these acts."530 The United Nation also set up a military observer mission in
Burundi Although reports indicate that the commission of inquiry submitted its report to the
Security Council available information indicate that no action has been taken in relation to the
report so far.
531
The sanctions by the Great lakes states are significant in a number of respects. First,
they are unprecedented. The Buyoya military coup was not the first in the countries bloody
political history; nor is it the first military coup in the region. 532 However, the coup was
unique in that it is the first coup against a democratically elected government. By slapping
sanctions on the military regime the regional states indicated that attempts to reverse trends
towards democracy in the region will no longer be tolerated. And by the OAU and the United
Nations Security Council acquiescing to the sanctions, they lent a cloak of legitimacy to this
and any future sub-regional intervention. 533 The sanctions may not have succeeded in
reversing the coup but they have achieved the objective of forcing the Buyoya junta into
peace talks with the ousted government and other stackholders in the fluid and complex
political situation that is Burundi. 534
530
Sec. Council Res. 101 2 3571st mtg, on 28 August, 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/1012 (1995).
53lSee Africa News online, http://www.africanews.org/east/burundi/19970523_featl.html.
532 There have been several coups in Uganda and Rwanda. The history of Burundi has been
characterized by hatred and bloody conflicts between these two ethnic groups. Records indicate that
since gaining independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has witnessed a number of massacres of
the Hutu by the Tulsi dominated military. For instance in April 1972 Micombero, a Tutsi military
ruler massacred an estimated 200,000 Hutus and eliminated all Hutus from the armed forces, to
suppress Hutu unrest. Col. Bagaza is also reported to have killed thousands of Hutus during his
1984-87 military rule. Buyoya the incumbent Burundi strongman recycled back to power by the Tutsi
dominated military, is reported to have butchered 20,000 people in operations to restore order in
August 1988 after eruptions of violence. See Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence,
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In this resolution the Security Council "expresses strong support for the efforts of the
OAU" and other organizations and individuals facilitating the peace process. U.N. SCOR. 3639th
Sess. U.N.Doc. S/RES/1049 (19%).
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3. Suppressing a Coup in Sierra Leone
On May 25, 1997 Maj. Paul Koroma Ousted from power the first democratically
elected president of Sierra Leone, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in a military coup. 535 This was the
third military take-over in five years. 536 It was hoped Kabbah's election 14-months earlier
would mark the end of a century of brutal authoritarianism that had characterized Sierra
Leone since the beginning of British colonial rule. 53, After winning the elections president
Kabbah earned international respect for quickly negotiating and signing a peace treaty to end
a five year war with the rural-based Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels of Foday
Sankoh. 538 RUF took arms against the government in 1991, leading to a conflict that claimed
an estimated 10,000 lives. 539
The ill-timed coup coincided with the 33rd OAU summit of the Heads of State and
Government in Harare (Zimbabwe). 540 In an unprecedented move, the OAU departed from
its past practice of at worst keeping mum and at best condemning coups and endorsed
military as well as diplomatic measures to reverse the coup. 541 The Assembly of Heads of
State and Government unanimously mandated the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) to use force and any other means to reverse the coup. The Chairman of
the OAU President Mugabe of Zimbabwe was categorical: "We are getting tougher and
tougher every time. I can assure you for the future coups it will be much tougher.. .We want
535CNN Interactive World News: http://cnn.conVWORLD/9706/03/sierra.leone/index.html.
536
'Id.
537The Washington Post: http://search.washingtonpost.com/w...ch/1979-05/26/084F-
052697-idx.html.
538
Africa news Online: http://www.africanews.org/west/sien-aleone/19970606_feat2.html.
53V
540
Pan-African News Agency, http://egi.bin.nando.net/plweb.egi/fastwe.
Reuters, http://www.yahoo.conVheadlmes/speciaVsierraleone/sierraleone. 1 .html.
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to (ensure) that conflict is avoided, democracy is not reversed and, where it is reversed, that
we attend to the situation . . Z'
542 The United Nations Secretary-General supported the OAU
decision: "If it becomes the last resort, we are prepared to support a military solution."543
Whether the ongoing negotiations to end the crisis peacefully between ECOWAS and
the ruling military junta will succeed is a matter of conjecture at this stage. 544 Whatever the
outcome of the ECOWAS initiative, however, the OAU decision is clearly unprecedented.
By endorsing intervention to resolve the Sierra Leone conflict, the OAU has reached a
watershed in its regional conflict resolution role. The ghost of non-interference in internal
affairs of member states that forms the core of the OAU normative structure and has cast its
spell over intra-state conflicts since the creation of the OAU, is slowly but surely getting
buried. A respected African weekly news magazine commenting on the Sierra Leone coup,
summed up this evolution thus:
At Harare, the OAU heads of state joined the rest of the international community in
unanimously condemning Sierra Leone's military take-over. But unlike in the past,
where the OAU stopped at mere condemnation, it called for the reinstatement of the
civilian government of president Kabbah by all means possible, including force if need
be. . . The question is whether we are seeing a determination by the OAU to adjust
its Charter to the new challenges of peace keeping and security which many domestic
civil clashes previously considered by the OAU to be the internal affairs of member
states, are now posing.
This is an important paradigmatic shift in the OAU conflict resolution and security
framework. Intervention in internal conflicts hitherto considered anathema due to the norm
M2CNN Interactive,
htrp://www.am.cx>DVWORIJ)/9706/()4/zimbabwe.new.amca/index.html.
^Pan-African News Agency,
http://www.africanews.org/westsieiTaleone/19970613_feat4.html.
544
AfricaNews Online, http://www.amcanews.org/west/sierraleone/19970613_feat3.html.
^^e Weekly Review June 13, 1997,
http://www.amraonlme.OT.ke/amc.. .stand/weekly
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of non-interference in internal affairs of member states, seems to be gaining currency as
legitimate way of settling regional conflicts. This is as it should be since, as argued before,
humanitarian intervention at least at the collective level as opposed to unilateral intervention
has crystalized into an accepted norm of international law. The OAU by engaging in
intervention to defend democracy and nullify the cancer of military dictatorships in Africa is
simply abandoning an archaic norm already discredited at the United Nations level.
However the new-found willingness on the part of the OAU to deal with the so-called
internal conflicts through intervention must be exercised with pragmatic caution. Intervention
should not be used to subvert social change. 546 Armed struggle or revolution still remain a
legitimate way of removing an unwanted regime from power. An intervention that stifles such
a process would be self-defeating and therefore unacceptable. A critical line must therefore
be drawn between totalitarian and dictatorial regimes on the one hand and popularly elected
governments in a free and fair election on the other hand. It is only on the overthrowal of the
later that the OAU has business in intervening to prevent the gun-totting warlords in
revolutionary straight-jackets like those currently in Sierra Leone from suppressing the
peoples will.
On the whole it is evident from the foregoing that, in a comparative sense, sub-
regional initiatives have been successful in resolving localized conflicts. It also appears that
a healthy partnership is evolving between the OAU and sub-regional bodies. In this
partnership the broad decisions of what nature of action or measures to be taken in resolving
a localized conflicts is taken at the OAU level. The modalities and technical details of
implementing the decision are left to the sub-regional bodies. In the case of Sierra Leone the
decision to intervene and reverse the coup was made by the OAU while ECOWAS was
mandated to implement the decision. This way, when major policy decisions are made at the
^^W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of Internal Law 267 (1964).
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continental level, the danger of dominant powers in a sub-regional level dominating the local
scene by influencing the decisions of a sub-regional body is greatly reduced. The accusation
that hegemonic dominance of Nigeria permeates the ECOWAS peace initiative that has
doggedly cast a shadow over the peace process could have been avoided if the intervention
in Liberia had followed this pattern.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has explored the role of the OAU in regional conflict resolution and dispute
settlement. In the introduction a glimpse into the historical origins as well as the normative
and institutional structure of the OAU was undertaken. The OAU was seen as a slave of time.
Created at a period when nationalism and sovereign integrity of states were the foremost
concepts in international relations _ especially so to African states which were emerging from
colonial subjugation. The OAU thus assimilated and entrenched these concepts into its
architectural foundation. Until recently the OAU remained a highly conservative institution
unresponsive to the changing times. Its unprecedented attempt to nullify the military coup in
Sierra Leone has been viewed as an attempt on the part of the OAU to come to terms with
the changing realities of inter-state relations. The OAU now seems to be prepared to no
longer treat internal conflicts and human rights as internal matters to be addressed only by the
affected state. This apparent behavioral change may however not last long; it faces the danger
of being undermined by the ultra-conservative forces within the OAU if it is not accompanied
by an overhaul of the OAU Charter to incorporate the new paradigms.
The thesis went further to characterize conflicts in Africa and to examine the OAU
conflict resolution initiatives. Although the OAU has been effective in resolving inter-state
conflict its performance in resolving intra-state conflicts was found to be wanting. This was
attributed to the practically and theoretically untenable dichotomy the OAU Charter creates
between intra-state and inter-state conflicts; placing intra-state conflicts beyond the purview
of the OAU. In a world so interdependent and closely linked together, such
compartmentalization of conflicts is simplistic and unrealistic. Purely internal or international
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conflicts do not exist. Inter-state conflicts have internal causes while the so-called internal
conflicts have international repercussions (like outflow of refugees and armed insurgencies
into neighboring states) that cannot be ignored by the affected states.
The relationship between the OAU as a regional organization and the Premier global
organization, the United Nations, in the arena of regional conflict resolution was also
examined. The Charters of both organizations invest them with the competence to deal with
regional conflicts. At the theoretical level, the involvement of both institutions in resolving
African regional conflicts therefore poses the problem of delimiting the jurisdictional frontier
of each institution. In practice however the involvement of both institutions has been mutually
reinforcing. Nonetheless, it was demonstrated that, for historical and constitutional reasons
the executive and judicial organs of the United Nations (the Security Council and the
International Court of Justice, respectively) have not been popular with the African states as
forums for resolution of African disputes, alternative to the OAU mechanisms. This state of
affairs however seems to have gradually changed in relation to the International Court of
Justice and is bound to change in relation to the Security Council if the ongoing reforms are
not scuttled.
Impediments to effective conflict resolution on the part of the OAU were also
explored. These impediments were found to be both Charter based and non-charter based. At
the institutional level an asymmetry of power between the Assembly of Heads of States and
Government and other organs of the OAU is inbuilt into the Charter. The juridical and extra-
juridical power of the Assembly was found to be so complete and pervasive that it
overwhelmed and emasculated the other organs. Specific suggestion on how this
unsatisfactory state of affairs could be rectified were offered, chief among them being the
empowerment of the office of the Secretary-General and the creation of a Judicial and
enforcement organ within the OAU institutional framework.
In the end a security framework for Africa within the existing international legal order
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was proposed. In this framework sub-regional organizations were seen as a necessary and
fundamental component. An evolving partnership between the OAU and these sub-regional
bodies was identified. There is however a need to develop a legal framework to govern this
partnership in order to give it juridical anchorage. Reformed institutions of the United Nations
were also allocated a critical role in this security arrangement.
The underlying hypothesis throughout was that a holistic appreciation of the role the
OAU has played in addressing the chronic problem of conflict in Africa
_
perhaps the most
critical challenge of our time
_
is a prerequisite to offering solutions. In this quest, several
fundamental questions and answers were apparent. The question whether the OAU has been
effective in resolving regional conflicts was answered in the negative. The ongoing debilitating
conflicts in Africa testify to this fact. The Answer to the question why the OAU has been
ineffective was located in both the historical underpinnings and the normative structure of the
OAU. The OAU was however credited with playing a leading role in wiping out the scourge
of colonialism (at least in its classical form), which was a major source of conflicts.
On the whole it must be concluded that nothing short of an overhaul of the Charter
of the OAU will cure the anomalies afflicting the organization. This calls for political will on
the part of the member states. Archaic norms that have done a lot of disservice to the African
region must be replaced by new ones. The OAU must be empowered and rejuvenated by
restructuring and revitalizing its institutions to cope with the vital role of resolving conflicts.
Any window dressing exercise will not suffice. Most Importantly, a new and revitalized OAU
must make the promotion and protection of human rights a fundamental norm incorporated
into its Charter and central to any conflict resolution initiative. After all protection of human
rights is a matter of course in international relations today. In any case, after all is said and
done, there is no other ethical justification for the existence of any institution
_
indeed even
the state itself
_
other than the welfare of humankind; which boils down to the promotion and
protection of human rights in the broadest meaning of the term.
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